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We argue that social capital as proxied by regional trust and the Rule of Law can improve aggregate
productivity through facilitating greater firm decentralization. We collect original data on the decentralization
of investment, hiring, production and sales decisions from Corporate Head Quarters to local plant
managers in almost 4,000 firms in the US, Europe and Asia. We find Anglo-Saxon and Northern European
firms are much more decentralized than those from Southern Europe and Asia. Trust and the Rule
of Law appear to facilitate delegation by improving co-operation, even when we examine "bilateral
trust" between the country of origin and location for affiliates of multinational firms. We show that
areas with higher trust and stronger rule of law specialize in industries that rely on decentralization
and allow more efficient firms to grow in scale. Furthermore, even for firms of a given size and industry,
trust and rule of law are associated with more decentralization which fosters higher returns from information
technology (we find IT is complementary with decentralization). Finally, we find that non-hierarchical
religions and product market competition are also associated with more decentralization. Together
these cultural, legal and economic factors account for four fifths of the cross-country variation in the
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have become increasingly aware of the importance of culture on international 
performance (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). One influential line of research argues that 
social capital as indicated by measures of trust or more widely, by the Rule of Law, fosters faster 
growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997 or La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
The mechanisms through which this might happen are not fully understood, however. In this paper 
we present evidence that high social capital in an area increases decentralized decision making 
within firms. We show that that decentralization favors productivity through supporting a larger 
equilibrium firm size and is complementary with information technology. 
 
Trust can be seen as a reflection of the congruence of preferences as in Aghion and Tirole (1997), or 
as a mechanism for obtaining co-operation in relational contracts as in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 
(1999). If a CEO can trust his senior managers he will be more willing to decentralize decision 
making – for example, the threat of theft is lower. Rule of Law should operate though a similar 
mechanism: there is more chance of getting stolen money back (and also less change of theft in the 
first place) if contracts are well enforced and respected.  
 
This paper subjects the “organizational” view of social capital to rigorous econometric investigation 
and concludes that trust is critical to the ability of a firm to decentralize. We show that trust in a 
region (even after controlling for country dummies) is associated with larger firms and a different 
pattern of industry specialization, and that even conditional on size and industry, firms in high trust 
areas are more decentralized.  
 
Countries that find decentralization more costly may suffer lower welfare for several reasons. First, 
it will be difficult for markets to effectively allow the more efficient firms to grow large. Penrose 
(1959) and Chandler (1962) argued that decentralization was essential for the creation of large firms, 
because CEOs are constrained over the number of decisions they can make. As firms grow CEOs 
need to increasingly decentralize decision making power to their senior management. In our data we 
find that larger firms are indeed significantly more decentralized. This is important because for 
capital and labor to be effectively reallocated across firms, productive firms need to grow large and 
take market share from unproductive firms. This reallocation is a major factor driving growth in   3
developed countries like the US.
1 But in developing countries like India, where firms are typically 
quite centralized, average firm size is smaller, so that the most productive firms have a smaller 
market share.
2 One potential explanation is CEOs in countries like India are less likely to delegate, 
for example because of the fear of theft by their senior management, constraining the growth of 
firms. The difficulties faced by firms in developing economies to grow reduces aggregate 
productivity by limiting the ability of productive firms to expand their market share, thereby 
reallocating resources away from less productive firms. 
  
Second, economies with low trust will specialize in industries where decentralization is less 
important. There has been a global trend towards more decentralization which is plausibly related to 
increasing competition (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2008), the supply of human capital (Caroli and Van 
Reenen, 2001) and the growth of information technology (Bresnahan, Brynjolffson and Hitt, 2002). 
In support of the latter idea we present evidence from production functions that information 
technology is complementary with decentralization
3. If these trends continue, low trust nations with 
a comparative disadvantage in decentralization will suffer lower productivity growth than those with 
greater social capital. 
 
To tackle these issues we need detailed information on the internal organization of firms across 
nations. The economic theory of organization has made great strides in the last two decades in 
furthering our understanding of activities within the boundary of the firm
4, but empirical research on 
this has lagged far behind because of a lack of organizational data. The few datasets that exist are 
either from a single industry
5 or (at best) across many firms in a single country
6. We address this 
lacuna by analyzing data on the organization of almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000 and 2006) who show that about 50% of productivity growth in 
manufacturing and about 90% in retail comes from reallocation. 
2 See, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009). 
3 Bloom, Garicano, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) present a model of a cognitive hierarchy where middle level 
employees (e.g. plant managers) will gain more power relative to the CEO when the cost of information acquisition falls 
(IT enables them to solve more problems without asking central “experts”). 
4 For a survey see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) or Gibbons and Roberts (2008). One branch of the literature 
investigates conditions under which delegated contracting replicates efficient centralized contracting, for example Baron 
and Besanko (1992) and Melumad et al (1995). However, this required complete contracts (see Mookherjee, 2006). A 
second branch emphasizes information processing and communication costs such as Sah and Stiglitz (1986), 
Genakopolos and Milgrom (1991), Radner (1993), Radner and Van Zandt (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and 
Garicano (2000). A third branch, closest to our perspective, emphasizes the trade off between information and loss of 
control – see Aghion and Tirole (1997), Rajan and Zingales (2001), Dessein (2002), Hart and Moore (2005) and Alonso, 
Dessein and Matouschek (2008). 
5 See, for example Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) on trucks or Garicano and Hubbard (2007) on legal services. 
6 See for example, Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007) for France and the UK, Colombo and 
Delmastro (2004) and Kastl, Martimort and Piccolo (2008) for Italy, and Rajan and Wulf (2007) for the US.   4
Europe, North America and Asia. We designed and collected this data using a new survey tool and 
measure the decentralization of investment, hiring, production and pricing decisions from the 
Central Head Quarters (CHQ/CEO) to plant managers. This data reveals startling differences in the 
cross-country decentralization of firms: those in the US and Northern Europe appears to be the most 
decentralized and those in Southern Europe and Asia the most centralized. 
 
Empirically, we find that trust and Rule of Law
7 are strongly associated with more decentralized 
firms. Trust is measured at the regional level using individual responses in the World Value Survey, 
and the positive relationship between trust and decentralization is even true for multinationals by 
country of origin: in California a multinational affiliate from Sweden (a high trust country) would 
typically be more decentralized than a multinational affiliate from Portugal (a low trust country). We 
further show this is driven by bilateral trust which seems to affect not only trade and investment 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008), but also the internal organization of multinationals.  
 
Two other factors also stand out in accounting for decentralization: religion and product market 
competition. Plants in areas with a high share of hierarchical religions
8 are significantly more 
centralized, which is potentially due to a lower taste for decision-making authority by local 
managers
9. Furthermore, we also find we find that decentralization is positively associated with the 
degree of product market competition. This may arise because of the greater importance of local 
knowledge in time sensitive environments or through disciplining effects, reducing the need for 
central monitoring. Together these cultural, legal and economic factors account for around 80% of 
the cross country variation in decentralization. 
 
Apart from the organizational economics and social-capital and development literature, our paper is 
also related to two other strands of the literature. One is on multinationals and comparative 
advantage. A recent body of theoretical work, such as Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Burstein 
and Monge (2007) and Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) emphasizes the importance of 
                                                 
7 Rule of Law is measure from the World Bank index developed by Kauffman, Kray and Matruzzi (2006), and we find 
that firms in strong Rule of Law countries tend to be more decentralized even after controls for a range of other country-
level factors like skills and levels of development.   
8 Our primary definition follows La Porta et al. (1997), who define Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam as 
hierarchical religions, but we investigate other partitions. 
9An alternative interpretation is that hierarchical religions reduce trust between people because they inhibit the 
horizontal bonds between individuals (Putnam, 1993, La Porta et al. 1997, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004). 
However, we still find some role for hierarchical religion even after controlling for its effect in reducing trust, suggesting 
an additional more direct effect on decentralization.    5
firm-level comparative advantage in multinationals. In these models firms have some productivity 
advantage, typically deriving from a different managerial or organizational technology, which their 
multinationals transplant to their overseas affiliates. Our evidence on the ability of multinationals to 
take their domestic organizational practices abroad provides empirical support for this assumption. 
 
Second, there is the literature on the transportation of culture by individuals across countries. For 
example, Fisman and Miguel (2008) show that the parking fine behavior of diplomats in New York 
is strongly predicted by indices of corruption in their home countries
10. Our evidence suggests that 
firms also take part of their “culture” abroad. Interestingly, we find this holds even in multinationals 
when all the managers come from the country of location, suggesting that firms offer an additional 
mechanism for transporting culture across countries. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sketches our models and its empirical implications, 
Section III details the data and Section IV has some descriptive statistics.  The empirical results are 
split into the basic results in Section V and some extensions in Section VI. Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EMPIRICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
We first look at theories of decentralization within a given firm holding size constant, and then the 
joint determination of decentralization and firm size. There is a huge theoretical literature on the 
determinants of decentralization within organizations and we do not aim to survey this, but instead 
give a framework for the empirical results which are the focus of the paper. 
 
II.A Trust, Rule of Law and Decentralization  
A number of papers such as Aghion and Tirole (1997), Prendergast (2002), Hart and Moore (2004) 
and Acemoglu et al (2007) consider the delegation decision in the context of an information-based 
approach. They motivate their models with a choice that a firm faces, for example over how to use a 
new technology. The principal is the Central Head Quarters (CHQ) and the agent is the plant 
                                                 
10 In the social domain, Fernandez and Fogli (2007) and Giuliano (2007) show that fertility rates among second-
generation Americans are correlated with fertility in the countries of their parents. And Ichino and Maggi (2000) study 
absenteeism and misconduct of employees at an Italian bank, and find that region of origin within Italy predicts shirking.   6
manager. The CHQ has a greater interest in maximizing the firm’s value than the manager, but the 
manager has greater local private knowledge than the CHQ. This trade-off determines the optimal 
degree of decentralization. Thus, characteristics of the environment that increases: (i) the value of 
local information; and (ii) the congruence of incentives between the CHQ and plant manager, will 
increase decentralization. If trust reflects a greater congruence of preferences between the parties, 
this should lead to great delegation. 
 
Even if decentralization was the efficient choice due to the characteristics of the firm’s environment, 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) emphasize that delegation is generally informal rather than 
formal because the CHQ must usually sign-off on decisions. The issue is whether the CHQ credibly 
commits to allowing the plant manager to effectively make the important decisions and does not 
override the plant manager (in order to establish his reputation not to interfere). Thus, the level of 
decentralization is the outcome of a repeated game between the CHQ and manager
11. The agent and 
principal’s preferences and beliefs in these models will of course influence the level of delegation. 
Trust is emphasized in the social capital and experimental game theory literatures as one factor that 
leads to co-operation (Putnam, 1993, Fukuyama, 1995; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 
2000). If there are heterogeneous types in the population with some ex ante being more likely to co-
operate than others, then the co-operative outcome (decentralization) is more likely.   
 
In principle, an alternative to trust in sustaining co-operation is Rule of Law. When the employer (or 
employee) can successfully sue for breach of contract this will make contracts easier to enforce and 
sustainable delegation more likely. This will be particularly important in larger firms (Greif 1993). 
So throughout our main analysis we will consider the independent influence of Rule of Law 
(“LAW”) alongside trust. 
Based on these theoretical considerations our main econometric model of decentralization takes the 
following form: 
ijkc ijkc c jc ijck u x LAW TRUST D + + + = ' 2 1 δ β β  
 
Where the outcome of interest is the degree of decentralization of plant i in region j in industry k in 
country c ( ijck D ). This is modeled as a function of four variables of interest: trust in the region j in 
                                                 
11 Other models, like Rajan and Zingales (2001) focus on the intangible capital view of the firm, with ownership being 
structured so that employees cannot easily split off easily to create rival firms.      7
country c where the plant is located ( jc TRUST ) and Rule of Law in the country where the plant is 
located (LAWc). We also include a vector of control variables,  ijkc x  and an error term, ijkc u . The 
controls include skills, multinational status, listing status, regional GDP per head, regional 
population and three digit industry dummies. When we include country dummies (as we do in most 
of our specifications) we cannot separately identify Rule of Law. We also construct a large number 
of other controls for the measurement error in  ijck D  including interviewer fixed effects and controls 
for the characteristics of the interview and interviewee (see data section). We consider specifications 
with and without controlling for firm size as discussed next. 
 
II.B Endogenizing Firm size 
The early literature on firm size focused on the issue of decentralization, arguing this was essential 
for creating large firms due to the time constraint on the number of decisions a CEO can take. 
Penrose (1959) developed the “resource based” view of the firm, claiming that managerial capacity 
was a key resource in determining firm size. If senior management time – and in particular CEO 
time – could be leveraged across a larger group of middle managers, then firm size could be 
increased.  
 
Chandler (1962) examined the growth of large modern multi-divisional firms in the US after the 
1850s. He argued that these larger firms were created through setting up “local field units”, which 
were regional factories or sales-outlets, with decentralized decision making power from the CHQ. 
Again, decentralization was necessary to allow distant units to operate, since limits on 
communication meant that the CHQ can never hope to direct managers operating hundreds of miles 
away. Without decentralization these firms would have not been able to grow. 
 
What naturally arises from this literature is the prediction that factors which facilitate 
decentralization, such as greater trust will encourage the creation of larger firms. This could then 
play a key role in increasing aggregate productivity through enabling more productive firms to 
increase their size and market share.  
 
One way to illustrate the impact of decentralization on firm size and aggregate productivity is 
through the Lucas (1978) model of firm size. In the Lucas model individuals have a spread of 
managerial talent, denoted x. High ability individuals (above some cut-off x*) act as managers and   8
all other individuals (those with ability below x*) work for them as employees. Managerial ability 
can be leveraged across many employees, but with a diminishing return. A manager of ability x 
managing a firm with n  employees and k  capital produces output of xg(f(n,k)), where f(.) is a 
standard production function, and g(.) is the managerial control function where g’(.) > 0 and 
g’’(.)<0. The decreasing returns in g(.) comes from the assumption of a finite span of control for 
managers, arising from their limited managerial supply of time. Increasing the ability of managers to 
effectively decentralize decisions in the Lucas (1978) model would be represented by a reduction in 
the concavity of g(.). For example, if g(.) were a Cobb-Douglas production function, g(z)=z
α, where 
0<α<1, this would be equivalent to increasing α. The impact of this would be to increase average 
productivity by raising the number of workers employed by the best managers. Simultaneously, it 
would increase the average firm size as the lower quality managers become workers (the ability 
threshold x* would increase) reducing the number of firms. The predictions of this are that: (i) trust 
should be associated with higher aggregate productivity, which the social capital literature discussed 




II.C Religion and competition  
A long literature since Weber (1930) argues that religious practices and beliefs have important 
consequence for economic growth (see also Barro and McCleary, 2006). A recent literature
13 
explores one dimension of this, arguing that hierarchical religions such as Catholicism reduce trust 
by inhibiting the formation of horizontal relations between people in favor of vertical relations with 
the Church. Religion may also have a direct link to decentralization, over and above its influence on 
trust, due to its association with preferences for autonomy. To see why, consider the idea that 
individuals have different tastes for autonomy – i.e. some people want to make their own decisions 
(rather than being told to do by their boss) more than others. This taste parameter varies in the 
population, so that when individuals in certain regions have a stronger taste for autonomy there is 
more likely to be decentralization. This variation in the taste for autonomy may be linked with the 
                                                 
12 Related to this is La Porta et al. (1997) who found in cross-country regressions that the combined size of the largest 25 
public quoted firms was positively correlated to trust and the Rule of Law. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2003) also 
looked across countries, again finding the average size of enterprises was significantly correlated with Rule of Law. 
Laevan and Woodruff (2007) looked at the impact of rule of law on firm size across regions within Mexico, finding 
larger firms where rule of law is better. We extend this work by: (i) looking at variations of trust within countries; and 
(ii) using the population of all firms which allows us to control for differences in coverage, listing, industry and 
enterprise definition across countries.  
13 See, for example, Putnam 1993, La Porta et al. 1997 and Guiso et al. 2004.   9
prevalence of hierarchical religions, defined as Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox and Islam following 
La Porta et al (1997). This could be because the success of these religions in different areas 
depended on their inhabitants’ preferences, so religious affiliations proxy for some deeper 
underlying cultural differences in tastes for autonomy. Alternatively, the presence of hierarchical 
religions could directly cause variations in the taste for autonomy, if it conditions individuals to be 
more accepting of authority from an early age
14.  
 
A final aspect we focus on is product market competition, which is also likely to affect 
decentralization for several reasons (see Guadalupe and Wulf, 2009, for a more extensive discussion 
and survey). First, more competitive environments put a greater emphasis on the rapid reaction to 
events because of a greater sensitivity of relative profitability to relative differences in marginal 
costs/quality between firms. In these circumstances, delegating to managers with local information 
will be particularly beneficial. Secondly, if competition is associated with an increased number of 
firms it makes yardstick competition easier to implement and therefore enables the CHQ to combine 
decentralization with increased managerial effort. Finally, if competition increases the threat of 
bankruptcy then the manager is more likely to make the firm’s value maximizing decision if the 
CHQ delegates. This makes the likelihood of decentralization greater when competition is tougher, 
although there are counterarguments. For example, more firms means more public knowledge so 
there is less need to delegate to privately knowledgeable managers. Consequently, the effect of 
competition on decentralization is ultimately an empirical issue. 
 
Our most general specification is therefore: 
 
ijkc ijkc ijkc ikc jc c jc ijck u x SIZE PMC HIER LAW TRUST D + + + + + + = ' 5 4 3 2 1 δ β β β β β  
 
Where HIER denotes the proportion of people in a hierarchical religion in the plant’s region and 
PMC is an indicator of product market competition. Unfortunately, many of the interesting structural 
characteristics of the industry such as its heterogeneity and technological complexity are not 
separately identified from industry dummies, so we cannot examine them in detail here (see 
Acemoglu et al, 2007).  
 
                                                 
14 Guiso et al (2003) argue for a causal effect of religion noting that Catholics growing up after Vatican II were more 
liberal than a control group.   10
III. DATA 
To investigate these theories we first have to construct a robust measure of organizational practices 
overcoming four hurdles: measuring decentralization, collecting accurate responses, ensuring 
international comparability and obtaining interviews with managers. We discuss these in turn.  
 
III.A Measuring Decentralization 
We asked four questions on plant manager decentralization. First, we asked how much capital 
investment a plant manager could undertake without prior authorization from the corporate 
headquarters (CHQ). This is a continuous variable enumerated in national currency which we 
convert into dollars using PPPs. We also inquired on where decisions were effectively made in three 
other dimensions: (a) hiring a new full-time permanent shopfloor employee, (b) the introduction of a 
new product and (c) sales and marketing decisions. These more qualitative variables were scaled 
from a score of 1, defined as all decisions taken at the corporate headquarters, to a 5 defined as 
complete power (“real authority”) of the plant manager. In Appendix Table A1 we detail the 
individual questions in the same order as they appeared in the survey.  
 
Some of these four questions are similar to others used in the past to measure decentralization. 
Acemoglu et al (2007) use a similar question on hiring in the British WERS data and Columbo and 
Delmastro (2004) have a question similar to our one on investment for Italian establishments
15. 
 
Since the scaling may vary across all these questions, we converted the scores from the four 
decentralization questions to z-scores by normalizing each one to mean zero and standard deviation 
one. In our main econometric specifications, we take the un-weighted average across all four z-
scores as our primary measure of overall decentralization, but we also experiment with other 
weighting schemes and also the individual questions.  
 
One issue is over measurement of decentralization across different organizational structures. Figure 
1 provides four examples to help explain how we did this. Example A shows the classic case, where 
the firm has one CHQ in New York and one production site in Phoenix. The plant manager is 
defined as the most senior manager at the Phoenix site, with our decentralization measure evaluating 
                                                 
15 Marin and Verdier (2007) use a count of a series of decentralization variables scaled between 1 and 5 in German and 
Austrian firms.   11
how much autonomy he has from his manager in New York. In Example B we depict a firm with 
multiple plants, in which we would usually survey one plant and assumed this represented the degree 
of decentralization for the firm (section III.F discusses how we test this assumption). In Example C 
we have a firm with the production facilities and CHQ on the same site. In this case if the plant 
manager was the CEO – which occurred in 4.9% of our interviews – we could not define 
decentralization (so these observations were dropped).
16 If the plant manager and CEO were 
different people on the same site we would define decentralization as usual, but we also confirm in 
Appendix A that our results are robust to dropping these “same-site” observations.
17 Finally, in 
Example D we show a multinational subsidiary, which we treat the same as domestic firms, defining 
decentralization as the autonomy of the plant from the domestic CHQ. Again, we also confirm 
robustness of our results to dropping these multinational subsidiaries
18. 
 
Finally, we collected a large amount of additional data from the survey to use as controls: 
management practice information following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); 
proportion of the workforce with degrees, average hours worked and the gender and age breakdown. 
We also collected ownership information from the managers, which we cross-checked against the 
external sample databases (see section III.E for details). From the sample database we also have 
information for most firms on their basic accounting variables like sales and capital stock. 
 
III.B Collecting Accurate Responses 
An important issue on our survey methodology is the extent to which we can obtain unbiased 
responses to our questions. In order to achieve this we took a range of steps to obtain accurate data.  
First, the survey was conducted by telephone without telling the managers they were being scored on 
organizational or management practices. This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s 
evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or 
the interviewer’s impressions. To run this “blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e. “To hire a 
                                                 
16 These were typically smaller firms (a mean firm employment of 159 for the CEO plant manager firms versus 843 for 
the rest of the sample), with an insignificant correlation between the share of firms dropped in each country and its 
average decentralization measure. The country level correlation was 0.345 (p-value of 0.272).  
17 Empirically, while plant managers with CEOs on site typically have less autonomy (something we control for 
empirically) it is not the case they have no autonomy. The CEO will typically be involved in a number of other tasks 
such as finance, strategy and sales (which could involve other non-production sites), while the plant manager runs the 
daily production process. An example in a university context would be a Dean of Humanities and the Head of the 
Economics Department – they are both on the same site, but the Head of Department still has some autonomy. 
18 We also asked two questions on decentralization from plant managers to workers over their allocation of tasks across 
teams and the determination of pace on the shop-floor (see Bloom et al, 2009). 
   12
full-time permanent shop-floor worker what agreement would your plant need from corporate 
headquarters”?), rather than closed questions (i.e. “Can you hire workers without authority from 
corporate headquarters?”[yes/no]). Following the initial question the discussion would continue 
until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices. For example, if 
the plant manager responded “It is my decision, but I need sign-off from corporate HQ.” the 
interviewer would ask “How often would sign-off typically be given?” with the response “So far it 
has never been refused” scoring a 4 and the response “Typically agreed in about 80%  of the case” 
scoring a 3.  
 
Second, the interviewers did not know anything about the firm’s financial information or 
performance in advance of the interview. This was achieved by selecting medium sized 
manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and contact details to the interviewers (but 
no financial details). Consequently, the survey tool is “double blind” – managers do not know they 
are being scored and interviewers do not know the performance of the firm. The interviewers were 
incentivized on the number of interviews they ran and so had no interest in spending time 
researching the companies in advance of running the interview. These manufacturing firms (the 
median size was 270 employees) are too small to attract much coverage from the business media. 
All interviews were conducted in the manager’s native language. 
 
Third, each interviewer ran 85 interviews on average, allowing us to remove interviewer fixed 
effects from all empirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent 
interpretation of categorical responses, standardizing the scoring system. Fourth, the survey 
instrument was targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have an overview of 
organizational practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations.  
 
Fifth, we collected a detailed set of information on the interview process itself (number and type of 
prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time-of-day, date and day-of-the 
week), on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and external 
employment experience, and location), and on the interviewer (we can include individual 
interviewer-fixed effects, time-of-day and subjective reliability score). These survey metrics are 
used as “noise controls” to help reduce residual variation. 
 
   13
III.C Ensuring International Comparability  
In comparing organizational and management surveys across countries we have to be extremely 
careful to ensure comparability of responses. To maximize comparability we undertook three steps. 
First, every interviewer had the same initial three days of interview training, provided jointly by the 
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) at the London School of Economics (LSE) and our 
partnering international consultancy firm. This training included three role-play calibration 
exercises, where the group would all score a role-played interview and then discuss scoring together 
of each question. This was aimed at ensuring every interviewer had a common interpretation of the 
scoring grid. In addition every Friday afternoon throughout the survey period the group met for 90 
minutes for training and to discuss any problems with interpretation of the survey. 
 
Second, the team operated from one location, the LSE. The different national survey teams were 
thus organized and managed in the same way, ran the surveys using exactly the same telephone, 
computer and software technology and were able to directly discuss any interpretation issues.
19 
Third, the individual interviewers interviewed firms in multiple countries. The team language was 
English, so that interviewers were able to interview firms from their own country plus the UK and 
US. As a result the median number of countries that each interviewer scored firms in was three, 
enabling us to remove interviewer fixed effects in the cross-country analysis. 
 
III.D Obtaining Interviews with Managers 
Each interview took on average 48 minutes and was run in the Summer of 2006. Overall, we 
obtained a relatively high response rate of 45%, which was achieved through four steps. First, the 
interview was introduced as “a piece of work”
20 without discussion of the firm’s financial position 
or its company accounts. Interviewers did not discuss financials in the interviews, both to maximize 
the participation of firms and to ensure our interviewers were truly “blind” on the firm’s financial 
position. Second, the survey was ordered to lead with the least controversial questions on (shop-floor 
operations management), leading on to monitoring, incentives and organizational structure. Third, 
interviewers’ performance was monitored, as was the proportion of interviews achieved, so they 
were persistent in chasing firms.
21 Fourth, the written endorsement of many official institutions
22 
                                                 
19 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgJXt8KwhA8 for video footage of the survey team. 
20 We avoided using the words “research” or “survey” as many firms link these to market research surveys. 
21 We found no significant correlation between the number, type and time-span of contacts before an interview is 
conducted and the management score.    14
helped demonstrate to managers this was an important academic exercise with official support. Fifth, 
we hired high quality (mainly MBA student) interviewers
23, mostly with prior manufacturing 
experience, which helped to signal to managers the high quality nature of the interview. 
 
III.E Sampling Frame and Additional Data 
Since our aim is to compare across countries we decided to focus on the manufacturing sector where 
productivity is easier to measure than in the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on medium 
sized firms, selecting a sample of firms with between 100 and 5,000 workers (with a median of 270). 
Very small firms have little publicly available data. Very large firms are likely to be more 
heterogeneous across plants. We drew a sampling frame from each country to be representative of 
medium sized manufacturing firms and then randomly chose the order of which firms to contact (see 
Appendix B for details).  Since we use different databases in Europe (Amadeus), the U.S. (Icarus), 
China and Japan (Oriana) and India (Firstsource) we had concerns regarding the cross-country 
comparisons so we include country dummies in most of the specifications. Comparing responding 
firms with those in the sampling frame, we found no evidence that the responders were 
systematically different on any of the performance measures to the non-responders. They were also 
statistically similar on all the other observables in our dataset. The only exception was on size and 
multinational status, where our firms were slightly larger and more likely to be multinational than 
those in the sampling frame (details in Data Appendix). 
 
III.F Evaluating and Controlling for Measurement Error  
The data potentially suffers from several types of measurement error. To quantify this we performed 
repeat interviews on 72 firms, contacting different managers in different plants at the same firm, 
using different interviewers. To the extent that our organizational measure is truly picking up 
company-wide practices these two scores should be correlated, while to the extent the measure is 
driven by noise the measures should be independent. The correlation of the first interview against 
the second interviews was 0.513 (p-value of 0.000). Furthermore, there is no obvious (or statistically 
significant) relationship between the degree of measurement error and the decentralization score. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
22 The Banque de France, Bank of Greece, Bank of Japan, Bank of Portugal, Beijing University, Bundesbank, 
Confederation of Indian Industry, European Central Bank, European Commission, Greek Employers Federation, IUI 
Sweden, Ministero delle Finanze, National Bank of Poland, Peoples Bank of China, Polish Treasury, Reserve Bank of 
India, Shenzhen Development Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, U.K. Treasury and Warsaw Stock Exchange 
23 Interviewers all post-graduate students drawn from the following universities:  Berkeley,  City  of  London,  Columbia, 
Harvard, HEC, IESE, Imperial, Insead, Kellogg, LBS, LSE,  Lund, MIT, Nova de Lisbon, Oxford, Stanford and Yale.   15
That is to say, firms that reported very low or high decentralization scores appeared to be genuinely 
very centralized or decentralized, rather than extreme draws of sampling measurement error. 
 
III.G Trust and Hierarchical Religions 
We build trust measures using the World Values Survey (WVS), a collection of surveys 
administered to representative samples of individuals in 66 countries between 1981 and 2004. These 
questionnaires contain information on several social, religious and political attitudes. The World 
Values Survey aims at measuring generalized trust, namely the expectation of the respondent 
regarding the trustworthiness of other individuals. The wording of this question is “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?”. The variable that we use in the econometric regression is the percentage of people 
choosing the first option in the trust question within the region where the plant is located.  
 
This is the most common measure of trust used in the literature, and appears to be correlated with 
trusting and/or trustworthy behavior. Glaeser et al (2000), for example, ran a series of experiments 
using Harvard undergraduate students to see if individual subject’s answers to the WVS trust 
questions are correlated with their trusting or trustworthy behavior. They find significance evidence 
that this WVS trust question is significantly correlated with the trustworthiness of subjects, even 
though they are not very good at predicting trusting behavior. They conclude that “While attitudinal 
trust surveys at best weakly predict any individual’s level of trust, they may be good at predicting 
the overall level of trustworthiness in society”. Sapienza et al. (2007) run another series of 
experiments using Chicago MBA students and find again this WVS question is correlated with 
individual behavior, although in their case significantly more with trusting behavior rather than 
trustworthiness. Since we are using these answers grouped to the level of the community as a whole, 
it is exactly the “society level” variation that we are using, so these papers are reassuring that this 
WVS trust question does appear to pick up variation in trust. 
 
Figure 2a plots the trust by country and its regional dispersion. In order to exploit this within country 
variation for identification, we allocate each plant to a well specified geographical region, and use 
the relevant WVS aggregate for our analysis
24.  
                                                 
24 The level of aggregation of the WVS variables is dictated by the level of regional detail provided in the survey which 
varies somewhat across countries. For example, in the US, China and India a region is a group of states, while in Europe 
a region is narrower coinciding with a NUTS2 or NUTS3 region. To correct for these cross country differences in the   16
 
We also use the World Values Survey also to measure the relative importance of different religions 
in the country or region of interest, using the information provided on the religious denominations of 
the respondents. Following La Porta et al (1997), the main variable of interest HIER is the 
percentage of the population belonging to a “hierarchical religion”, defined as Catholic, Islamic or 
Eastern Orthodox
25. Figure 2b plots the country average of HIER and its regional dispersion. The 
correlation between HIER and Trust is -0.67, significant at the 1% level.  
 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
IV. A Decentralization 
Our preferred measure of decentralization is an average across four z-scored measures of plant 
manager autonomy on hiring, capital expenditure, marketing and product innovations. The resulting 
variable is what we define as decentralization (or autonomy of the plant manager). 
 
The cross country averages of decentralization are shown in Figure 3, revealing some interesting 
patterns. Firms located in Asia (China, Japan and India) tend to be much more centralized than firms 
located in Anglo-Saxon (Germany, UK and US) and Scandinavian (Sweden) countries. The rest of 
Europe tends to be in the middle of the decentralization ranking – with the exception of firms 
located in Greece, which appear to be very centralized. The differences between the three groups of 
countries are statistically significant at the 1% level, even when we include a full set of firm 
characteristics and survey noise controls. Table A2 in Appendix provides more details behind these 
cross-country comparisons and reveals that, while Sweden, the UK and the US are at the top of the 
decentralization distribution across all four dimensions, for the rest of the countries the ranking 
varies. For example, Germany tends to be closer to the other Continental European countries 
included in our sample (i.e. less decentralized) with regards to the hiring and firing autonomy of the 
plant manager. On the other hand, plant managers working in Japan have limited autonomy because 
                                                                                                                                                                   
regional definition, we weight each regression by the ratio of the number of respondents in the region and the overall 
number of respondents in the country. Weighting by total number of respondents gives similar results, but this gives 
larger weight to the countries where the WVS covers more individuals. See Appendix B for details. 
25 Since Sunni Muslims do not have the same type of hierarchical religious structure and orthodoxy as Catholicism and 
Christian Orthodoxy (see Allen, 1995) the inclusion of Islam in the HIER variable may be disputed. To address this 
concern we also experiment with an alternative version of the HIER variable that excludes Islam. This leaves our main 
results virtually unchanged.   17
hiring is very centralized due to lifetime tenure. Japanese firms do provide more autonomy over 
capital expenditures and Japanese workers also have high levels of autonomy. 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the decentralization variable across countries. It is clear that there 
is a huge amount of heterogeneity, even within countries. About 15% of the overall variance in our 
decentralization measure is across countries, 8% is across SIC 3-digit industry class, and 81% of the 
variation is orthogonal to both country and SIC 3-digit industry.  
 
IV.B External Validation 
A possible concern is that the cross country differences in decentralization emerging from our study 
may reflect the specific characteristics of the firms which participated in the survey (i.e. medium 
sized manufacturing firms), rather than more general organizational features. Therefore, to validate 
our decentralization measure, we compared it to two other cross-country decentralization indices 
that exist in the literature. 
 
The first is the Power Distance rankings created by Hofstede (2001). The Power Distance Index 
(PDI) is a measure of interpersonal power or influence between a boss and its subordinate, built out 
of successive attitudinal surveys conducted on more than 70,000 IBM employees across 
approximately 50 countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Where our decentralization variable provides a 
factual description of the average autonomy allocated to the plant-managers, the PDI measures the 
perceptions of and the preferences for hierarchical among non-managerial IBM employees. The PDI 
measure is based on aggregating questions relating to: (i) non-managerial employees’ perception that 
employees are afraid to disagree with their managers; (ii) subordinates’ perception that their boss 
tends to take decisions in an autocratic or paternalistic way; and (iii) Subordinates’ preference for 
anything but a consultative style of decision making. High PDI values reflect perceptions of and 
preferences for self-determination. Figure 5 shows that the country level averages of the PDI and our 
decentralization measure are extremely similar (correlation 0.80, significant at the 1% level). This is 
reassuring since it suggests that across countries our decentralization variable captures long-lived 
organizational traits across countries, rather than specific characteristics of our firm sample.  
 
The second cross-country decentralization indices are those created by Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2005) to evaluate fiscal decentralization across countries. They generated an index on a 0 to 4 scale 
that averaged over scores for decentralization of Government structure (unitary versus federal) and   18
the degree of autonomy and democratization of state, province and municipal governments over 
taxation, education, infrastructure and policing. A value of 0 denotes the country is fully centralized 
across every dimension, while a value of 4 denotes a highly decentralized fiscal structure. This 
measure was calculated for every country with 10 million or more employees in 1995, which 
includes ten of our twelve countries. Figure 6 shows this fiscal decentralization index is also 
extremely close to our decentralization index (correlation of 0.827, significant at the 1% level). 
Thus, countries in our sample with decentralized firms also tend to have decentralized governments 
suggesting this is a more general phenomenon. 
 
V.  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DECENTRALIZATION 
 
V.A Trust and Decentralization  
Main Results 
As discussed in Section III, incentives to delegate are likely to be diminished in low trust 
environments. Column (1) of Table 1 presents the results of regressing our decentralization measure 
against average trust in the region of the country where the plant is located, with no other controls. 
The relationship between decentralization and trust is positive and highly significant (coefficient 
1.115, standard error 0.437). A possible concern is that high levels of trust could simply proxy for 
better law enforcement, which in turn may facilitate decentralization even in low trust areas. 
Therefore, in column (2) we include “Rule of Law”
26 that enters with a positive and significant 
coefficient and reduces the coefficient on trust from 1.196 to 0.857. This suggests that Rule of Law 
is likely to play a role in encouraging decentralization directly, but that trust also plays an 
independent role since it remains significant at the 1% level.
27 Trust may be associated with 
decentralization because it sustains larger equilibrium organizational size. Consistent with this 
mechanism, column (3) shows that larger firms and plants tend to be more decentralized. 
                                                 
26 This indicator was developed by the World Bank and measures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al, 2007). 
27 Interestingly, we also find that decentralization regressed on family management (and nothing else) is negative and 
significant (coefficient of -0.194, standard error of 0.039). If we also include trust and Rule of Law these are highly 
significant and the family management variable becomes insignificant (coefficient of -0.042 and standard error of 
0.030). This suggests that family managed firms are more hierarchical, but potentially because they are formed in areas 
of low trust and weak rule of law where family ownership is a response to the inability to separate ownership and 
control.   19
Conditioning on size reduces the coefficient on trust, but it remains positive and significant, 
suggesting that even for firms of a given size, trust facilitates decentralization. 
 
Country level indices such as Rule of Law are problematic because they could be correlated with 
many omitted unobserved country-level factors like regulation (Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer, 
2008). In column (4) we include country level fixed effects to control for these, so that the trust 
coefficient is identified only from variation across regions within a country. We also control for 
regional-level observables (GDP per capita and population) and a general set of firm controls. We 
find that the coefficient on trust falls slightly to 0.699, but remains positive and significant at the 5% 
level.  
 
In terms of our key covariates in column (4) we find larger firms tend to be more decentralized. This 
is consistent with the predictions of Alfred Chandler and Edith Penrose, that because CEOs have 
limited management time, they will delegate more in larger firms. We also find that foreign 
multinationals are more decentralized relative to both home country multinationals and purely 
domestic firms. This could again reflect overall firm-size and the larger information gap over greater 
distances as Chandler emphasized. Finally, more skilled firms are more likely to be decentralized
28.  
 
We checked whether the trust result may simply capture more general social capital effects. We 
included “CIVIC”, a variable constructed from the World Value Survey and widely adopted in the 
Social Capital literature
29, with higher values signifying a higher leniency towards “uncivil” 
behaviors. The coefficient on CIVIC was insignificant, and left the coefficient on trust practically 
unchanged.  
 
The magnitude of the association between decentralization and trust is large. For example, moving 
from the lowest trust region (Assam in India) to the highest trust region (Norrland in Sweden) would 
be associated with an increase of the decentralization index of 0.44 of a standard deviation.
30  
                                                 
28 The results are unchanged when we include measures of regional skills, which is positive but insignificant. 
29 Respondents were asked to assign a score between one and ten as to whether they agreed that certain behaviors were 
justified, with a one indicating the behavior was never justified and a ten indicating that the behavior was always 
justified. The five behaviors are (1) claiming a government benefit to which you are not entitled, (2) avoiding a fare on 
public transport, (3) cheating on taxes if you have the chance, (4) buying something that you knew was stolen and (5) 
accepting a bribe in the course of one’s duties. The CIVIC variable is the sum across the five different questions and 
may range between 5 and 50. The average value of CIVIC in the regression sample is 9.60, and the correlation of the 
variable with trust is -0.56, significant at the 1% level. 
30 Using the 0.699 coefficient in column (4) and the trust values in Assam and Norrland of 0.13 and 0.76 respectively.   20
Multinationals 
Our sample includes a substantial number of multinational subsidiaries. Looking more closely at the 
multinational subsidiaries is interesting for two reasons. First, we are interested in whether 
characteristics (like trust) in the multinational’s country of origin have an association with the 
organizational structure in the multinational’s foreign affiliate. This has long been a pre-occupation 
of business case studies, and the more recent trade literature on the organization of multinationals.
31 
Second, we can include regional fixed effects when conducting this type of analysis, thereby 




The key hypothesis that we want to study is whether the organization of these types of plants is 
influenced by the level of trust prevailing in their country of origin (i.e. where the headquarters of 
the multinationals are located). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. These regressions 
are based on the specification of column (3) in Table 1, where we test the relationship between 
decentralization and trust (measured in the region of the plant’s location), except with two digit 
rather than three digit industry controls because of the smaller multinational sample. Column (1) 
shows that in the full sample, the coefficient on trust remains positive and significant (0.627 with a 
standard error of 0.309). In column (2) we repeat the specification constraining the sample to be only 
foreign multinationals. Although the magnitude of the coefficient on trust is broadly comparable to 
column (1), the variable is not significant at conventional levels. To examine whether the 
organizational structure of foreign subsidiaries is influenced by the level of trust prevailing in their 
country of origin, we add to the baseline specification the average level of trust in the country where 
the headquarters of the firm owning the plant are located.
33 Column (3) shows that subsidiaries of 
firms headquartered in high-trust countries tend to be significantly more decentralized (coefficient 
0.767, standard error 0.298). Working with the trust variable measured in the country of origin 
allows us to include as additional controls a full set of regional dummies. By doing this, we can 
examine the association between decentralization and trust abstracting for all the time-invariant 
characteristics of the region of location. In column (4), the inclusion of the regional dummies does 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) or Burstein and 
Monge (2008). 
32 This also includes any potential language or national bias in the interview process, since multinationals are always 
interviewed in the local language, with the question on the ownership of the firm only asked at the end of the interview. 
33 Note that the clustering is now based on region-country or origin pairings. We did not disaggregate the country of 
origin variables to the region of origin because the region that a company is headquartered in may be due to purely legal 
reasons.    21
not affect the significance and the magnitude of the country of origin trust coefficient, which 
remains significant at the 5% level.
34 
 
A second measure of trust we use is the bilateral trust measure from a series of surveys conducted 
for the European Commission. These asked around 1,000 individuals in each country the following 
question “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various 
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, 
or no trust at all”. This question was asked about all other EU countries and a number of non-EU 
countries like the US, Japan and Canada. In column (5) we restrict the sample to European 
multinationals for which the have a measure of bilateral trust between their country of origin and 
their country of location
35. This measure of bilateral trust is significantly associated with 
decentralization – subsidiaries of firms in countries the multinational’s parent country tends to trust 
(like French subsidiaries in Belgium) are typically more decentralized than subsidiaries in countries 
the multinational’s parent country does not trust (like French subsidiaries in Britain). In column (6) 
we include both a full set of country location and origin dummies, so that we are only identifying the 
trust effect of the pair wise variation in trust. Even in this demanding specification higher bilateral 
trust is associated with significantly more decentralization. 
 
Finally, in Column (7) we instrument bilateral trust using the approach developed by Guiso et al. 
(2009). They examine the impact of trust on cross-country trade and investment and find that greater 
trust appears to encourage both. They develop a set of instruments for trust based on religious and 
ethnic similarities between pairs of countries
36. When trust is instrumented with these religious and 
somatic distance measures our point-estimates for the impact on decentralization remain virtually 
unchanged, although the larger standard errors mean these are no longer significant at conventional 
levels. This result is suggestive of a causal effect of trust on decentralization in firms. Interestingly, 
                                                 
34 We experimented by including the Rule of Law index from the multinational’s home country, and find that this 
variable is insignificant (point estimate -0.108 and standard-error 0.092). This suggests that not every factor in the 
multinational’s home country is important for local decentralization, but only those that are likely to be transplanted 
abroad in the multinational’s managerial and organizational structure. 
35 If we re-run the column (4) specification with the column (5) sub-sample the results are very similar, with a point-
estimate (standard-error) on the key trust (country of origin) variable of 0.872 (0.677). This suggests that this sub-sample 
of European multinationals is representative of the larger sample. 
36 Religious differences are calculated as the product of the fraction of individuals in each country in each religion, and 
genetic distances as the somatic gap between countries in terms of differences in hair color, facial shape and height (see 
Appendix for details). The idea is that countries with different religions and different visual appearances are less likely to 
bilaterally trust each other. Guiso et al. (2009) show these two measures are an important predictor of bilateral trust, and 
are robust to controls for similarities in law and language, informational overlap and geographic distance.   22
it also provides one potential mechanism for the Guiso et al. (2009) FDI results. Multinational firms 
have a greater need to decentralize to foreign subsidiaries due to the local managers’ better private 
information, but will be reluctant to do so when they do not trust the local management. Being able 
to decentralize will increase the attractiveness of these locations for FDI. This also suggests a cross-
country selection mechanism for industrial location. Industries requiring greater levels of 
decentralization should operate in higher-trust countries, something we will confirm in sub-section 
V.C. 
 
V.B Trust and firm size 
In Table 1 we showed that larger firms are more decentralized - in this sub-section we examine 
whether trust fosters larger average firm size, suggesting an additional route by which social capital 
fosters decentralization. 
 
To do this we use the population of all public and private firms from our accounting databases 
detailed in the Data Appendix to measure average firm size in manufacturing (i.e. we do not use the 
variables in our organizational survey). These databases appear broadly comprehensive for firms 
with 100 or more employees.
37 Because of this we use the average size of the population of 
manufacturing firms with over 100 employees as our main dependent variable. These larger 100+ 
employee firms are also the group we targeted in our organizational survey. One reason we surveyed 
this group of 100+ employee firms is because they are likely to require some kind of formal 
management structure. In smaller firms – say a 10 person factory – the CEO can directly manage all 
employees, taking all decisions directly. 
 
In column (1) of Table 3 we show that firms in a given region are much larger when trust is higher 
and Rule of Law is stronger. This is consistent with the earlier cross-country trust results in La Porta 
et al. (1997) and Kummar, Raghuram and Zingales (2005), and cross-region Rule of Law results in 
Mexico in Laeven and Woodruff (2007). In column (2) we go beyond the prior literature by 
including a full set of country dummies and exploiting within country variations in trust which 
allows us to control other cross country factors that could be generating these results. The coefficient 
on trust remains positive and significant.  
                                                 
37 In some countries like India smaller firms are often unregistered. But for manufacturing firms with over 100 
employees this is much less likely, given these firms typically operate with a large production facility which will be hard 
to keep hidden from the authorities. Given our focus is on the size of firms rather than the size of plants using firm level 
databases (rather than Census databases on plants) is appropriate.    23
In columns (3), (4) and (5) we re-estimate our specification from column (2), but for a greater range 
of the total firm size distribution. The coefficient on trust falls to some extent as we include more of 
the size distribution which is what we would expect if trust particularly mattered for large firms 
(from 1.851 for 100+ employee firms in column (2) to 1.540 for all firms in column (4)). 
Nevertheless, trust remains significant throughout all columns.  
 
The magnitude of the trust coefficient in column (2) is large – for example moving from the lowest 
trust region (Assam in India) to the highest trust region (Norrland in Sweden)  - would be associated 
with a 117 log point increase in firm size. Given the importance of large firms for reallocation and 
aggregate productivity growth, this highlights a potentially important role for social capital and 
culture in explaining aggregate productivity. 
 
V.C Industry structure and decentralization 
The factors that facilitate greater decentralization within firms should also influence industry 
composition across regions and countries. If some industries require greater decentralization for 
efficient production – for example if they are technologically fast moving - then we should see these 
located in higher trust areas. To investigate this we calculated an “implied industry 
decentralization”, IDj, for each region as follows: 
∑ × =
k
k jk j D E ID  
where j denotes region and k denotes two digit industry, Ejk is the share of employment in each two 
digit industry in each region calculated from the population of all public and private firms in that 
region (see Appendix), and Dk is the average decentralization value for that industry in our sample in 
the UK. We choose the UK as the base country because (a) it is a relatively high-trust and Rule of 
Law country where firms are likely to be closer to being optimally decentralized, and (b) we have a 
large sample of firms in the UK spread across every industry enabling us to generate industry level 
decentralization measures.
38 In the regression we then drop the UK, so that our survey data used to 
generate industry implied decentralization does not overlap with the regions in the regression. 
 
                                                 
38 We have 570 observations in the UK. The other potential base-country to use is the US with 643 observations. We 
choose the UK as: (i) it has a more even coverage across industries than the US, which has some industries with small 
firm numbers; and (ii) it has fewer regions than the US, so since we drop the base country this allows for a larger 
regression sample. Re-estimating using the US numbers also gives significant trust and rule-of-law results, with for 
example, the standard errors (point estimates) 0.209 (.037) and 0.059 (0.011) respectively in columns (1) and (2).   24
In Table 4 we regress IDk the implied industry decentralization measure against trust in the region in 
column (1) and obtain a significant and positive impact. This implies that high trust regions tend to 
specialize in industries that are more decentralized. In column (2) we add Rule of Law, which varies 
only by country, and find a similar result: strong Rule of Law countries have more employment in 
decentralized industries. In column (3) we include a full set of country controls, and the trust 
variable, finding similar point estimates but larger standard errors. 
 
In summary, an interpretation of our results is that trust fosters greater decentralization through 
enabling countries to specialize in industries where decentralization matters more, through fostering 
FDI and larger firms. Furthermore, even conditional on industry, size and multinational status, high 
trust regions have more decentralized organizations. Before linking these relations with productivity 
in the next section, we will examine other determinants of decentralization. 
  
VI. EXTENSIONS: RELIGION AND COMPETITION  
The previous section established the importance of social capital for decentralization. In this section 
we consider two other key factors that affect decentralization: religion and competition and then 
consider how well we can account for the cross country variation in firm organization highlighted in 
Figure 3. We then consider a battery of robustness tests. 
 
VI.A Hierarchical Religions 
As discussed in section II, religion could be linked to the decentralization of firms due to either its 
indirect impact on trust, or more directly through it links with a managerial “taste” for autonomy. 
Following La Porta et al (1997), we focus on is the percentage of the population belonging to a 
“hierarchical religion”, defined as Catholic, Islamic or Eastern Orthodox. The results of the analysis 
are shown in Table 5. Column (1) starts by regressing the decentralization variable against the 
religion variable with no extra controls except for GDP per capita and population in the plant’s 
region. Plants located in regions with a high share of hierarchical religions tend to be significantly 
less decentralized than others. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on hierarchical religion is 
robust to the inclusion of the Rule of Law index, although since these are negatively correlated, this 
does substantially reduce the point estimate on hierarchical religions, which falls to -0.268. Column 
(3) shows that the hierarchical religion effect is also robust to the inclusion of a full set of country, 
noise, industry and firm controls. In particular, trust continues to have a significant relationship with   25
decentralization, implying that both trust and religion have independent associations with 
organization. The role of hierarchical religion goes beyond the trust effect highlighted in the prior 
literature.
39 The size of this relationship is also large, so for example based on the column (3) 
specification going from the Swedish to Greek levels of hierarchical religion is associated with a 
reduction in decentralization of 0.446, almost half a standard deviation.
40 
 
In column (4) we instrument religious affiliation using data from five European countries whose 
acceptance or rejection of the reformation can arguably be claimed to be driven by random events
41. 
In each of these five countries we coded each region as unity if they accepted the reformation, and 
zero otherwise and use this as an instrument. The results show a similarly negative point estimate of 
-0.764 for the impact of hierarchical religions on decentralization (compared to -0.606 for this 
sample under OLS).  Finally, in Column (5) we use the sub-sample of foreign multinational 
subsidiaries and find that – similarly to trust – subsidiaries of firms headquartered in countries with a 
high share of hierarchical religions tend to be significantly less decentralized than others. This 




As discussed in the theory section, many authors have speculated that competition may have 
stimulated decentralization, perhaps because of the greater time sensitivity of decisions and therefore 
the greater implied value of the manager’s local knowledge. Table 6 examines this for the first time 
on cross country micro-data with comparable measures of decentralization. We use three broad 
measures of product market competition following Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005). The first 
                                                 
39 We ran a series of robustness tests on the column (3) specification. For example dropping the US where religious 
affiliation is primarily correlated with recent immigration patterns rather than historic variation, and found the point 
estimate on HIER rises to -0.705 (standard error of 0.235). We also regressed decentralization on the shares for 
individual religious blocks (with atheist as the baseline) and found coefficient (standard errors) of -0.686 (0.224), -1.961 
(0.862) and -0.417 (1.021) on the share of Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims in the region respectively. 
40 0.446=0.494*(0.909-0.014), where 0.909 and 0.014 are the Greek and Swedish share of hierarchical religions. 
41 Two of these are the Sweden and the UK, whose motivation to undertake the reformation was driven by the need to 
replenish their King’s treasuries following expensive wars with Denmark and France respectively, and in the UK’s case 
also because of the need for Henry VIII to obtain a divorce (Barro and McCleary, 2005). Another two of these countries 
are France and Poland, whose eventual rejection of the reformation followed a long and unpredictable struggle. In the 
case of France it became Catholic only after the 36 year Wars of Religion between the protestant Huguenots and the 
French Catholics. Eventually the Protestant Henry of Navarre was proclaimed King after converting to Catholicism with 
the famous quote “Paris is worth a mass”. In the case of Poland its King Sigmund II, and the majority of the nobility 
were protestant from the mid 1540s until the 1560s, until the Jesuits launched a successful counter reformation and the 
country swung back to Catholicism. Finally, Germany itself was sufficiently marginal that the some parts accepted the 
reformation (the South and West) and other parts did not (the North and East).   26
measure is the degree of import penetration in the country by two-digit industry measured as the 
share of total imports over domestic production. This is constructed for the 5-year period 1999-2003 
to remove any potential contemporaneous feedback. The second is the country by three digit 
industry Lerner index of competition, which is (1 – profits/sales), calculated as the average across 
the entire firm level database (excluding the firms in the survey). Again, this is constructed for the 5-
year period 2000-2004 to remove any potential contemporaneous feedback.
 42 The third measure of 
competition is the manager’s response to the survey question on the number of competitors a firm 
faces, valued zero for “no competitors”, one for “between one and five competitors”, and two for “5 
or more competitors”.  
 
In column (1), we see that greater import competition is positively and significantly associated with 
greater decentralization. In column (2), we re-estimate the same specification but now include a full 
set of controls including trust, religion, skills, size, multinational status, a full set of country and 
three-digit industry dummies. Even after conditioning on these additional covariates we find that the 
more competitive country-industry pairings contain firms that are on average significantly more 
decentralized. In columns (3) and (4) we run two identical specifications but use the lagged industry-
level (inverse) Lerner index as an alternative measure of competition. We again find a significant 
and positive association between competition and decentralization. In columns (5) and (6), we run 
two further similar specifications using the plant manager’s own self reported measure of the 
perceived number of competitors. Again we find a positive and significant association: the more 
rivals a firm perceives it faces the more decentralized it appears to be
43. 
 
VI.C Quantification of cross-country differences in decentralization 
To evaluate the overall explanatory power for decentralization of our four main variables: trust, Rule 
of Law, religion and competition; we evaluate their R
2 in firm, regional and country regressions 
(with no other explanatory variables). When we do this for the 3,660 firm level observations we find 
an R
2 of 12.8% (adjusted R
2 of 12.6%). When we do this at the regional level on the 112 regional 
observations (taking regional averages of all variables) we find an R
2 of 66.3% (adjusted R
2 of 
                                                 
42 The 1999 data was not available in the Oriana accounting database for China and Japan, so we used 2000-2004 for all 
countries. 
43 The magnitude of the competition effect on average decentralisation scores is of economic as well as statistical 
significance. For example in column (6) increasing the number of competitors from zero to five is associated with an 
increase in the decentralization index of 0.196, about one fifth of a standard deviation. 
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65.0%). And at the country level (taking country averages of all variables) we find an R
2 of 83.3% 
(adjusted R
2 of 73.7%).  
 
Hence, at the firm level the predictive power of these variables is limited. In part this reflects the 
measurement error in our indicator of firm-level decentralization, which our re-rater evaluation in 
section III.F suggests accounts for about 50% of the firm-level variation. In addition there are no 
doubt many other idiosyncratic firm-level factors which influence optimal decentralization. 
 
At the regional level the explanatory power of these variables is substantially larger, presumably 
because measurement error and firm-level idiosyncratic factors average out. This is visually clear 
from Figure 7, which plots the actual values for regional decentralization against the predicted 
values from the regression. Regions like Assam (in India) have a low degree of predicted 
decentralization because of low trust, weak Rule of Law and low levels of competition. Regions like 
Upper Norrland (in Sweden) have a high degree of predicted decentralization between of high trust, 
strong Rule of Law and low levels of hierarchical religion. 
 
At the country level the fit is extremely good with the exception of Japan. This is predicted to have a 
high level of decentralization because of good trust, strong Rule of Law and low levels of 
hierarchical religion. But as is shown in Figure 3 Japan displays a centralized organizational 
structure on average. One puzzling fact is that we find Japanese firms are extremely good at 
adopting “lean manufacturing” in our survey
44. Lean manufacturing includes practices such as 
worker autonomation (limited worker self-management), the involvement of workers in continuous 
improvement and the ability of workers to stop the production line. What the survey suggests is that 
plant managers in Japan do not enjoy the same relatively high level of autonomy as their workers do 
from the plant managers. So decision making rights in Japan appear more concentrated at the top 
and bottom of the firm, and not in the hands of the plant managers.  
                                                 
44 In the management component of the survey we have two questions on Lean Manufacturing processes, with Japanese 
firms having the highest average scores for the adoption on Lean Manufacturing by domestic firms, which is 
unsurprising since Japan is the origin of the “Toyota system”.   28
VI.D Robustness  
To investigate the robustness of the decentralization results, Table 7 reports results where we re-
estimate our most general specification (column (6) in Table 6) on various sub-samples, with other 
controls and different measures of decentralization. In general, the results are stable.  
 
The first column of Table 7 simply reproduces the results from column (6) in Table 6 for ease of 
comparability. The second and third columns re-estimate this on the sub-sample of firms with only 
one production plant and those with multiple production plants respectively. The trust coefficient has 
the same sign in both samples, but is larger and more significant in the multi-plant firm sample. This 
suggests the effect of trust (and competition) is stronger in larger multi-plant firms, consistent with 
the idea that it is in these more complex organizations where agency issues matter more that these 
factors are most important. 
 
In columns (4) and (5) we split by whether the CEO is on the production site being interviewed. For 
the sites where the CEO is not on-site the trust variable has a higher coefficient, consistent with the 
idea of trust being more important for longer distance relationships. In column (6) we restrict the 
sample to firms with 250 to 5,000 employees, to restrict to the larger firms in our sample with a 
slight increase in the key coefficients. In column (7) we restrict the analysis to privately held firms to 
control for potential sampling bias with publicly listed firms, and again find similar results on the 
key variables. Column (8) looks at the ten OECD countries, again finding very similar results
45. 
Columns (9) and (10) illustrate the results across the domestic and Foreign Multinationals sample 
showing similar results. 
 
The Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) management practices measure is included in Column (11), 
which is highly significant suggesting that better runs firms tend to be more decentralized, without 
changing the trust coefficient. Columns (12) and (13) run robustness tests on the multinationals 
results. Column (12) displays the results from re-running our baseline specification of column (3) in 
Table 6, but restricted to the sub-sample of multinational subsidiaries for which we have the global 
assets, a measure of the multinational group’s overall size. Column (13) includes this global assets 
measure, which is positive suggesting larger multinationals tend to decentralized more, although not 
                                                 
45 In China and India despite the much smaller sample size (487 firms), the competition and religion variables are still 
significant (column (9)). In the China and India sample, however, the trust term falls substantially, potentially because of 
the much more limited variation in this.   29
significantly after controlling for size of the plant and subsidiary. Column (14) re-runs our baseline 
specification of column (3) in Table 6, but restricted only to firms who reported having no managers 
from the multinational’s home country.
46 Trust by country of origin is still statistically significant, 
suggesting even multinationals who hire domestic employees adopt some organizational practices of 
their country of origin. Column (15) drops Islam from the definition of a hierarchical religion and 
finds very similar results, reflecting in part the very low share of Muslims in some of our sample 
countries. Finally, in column (16) we use our alternative worker autonomy measure, based on 
questions D6 and D7 in Appendix A, which evaluate the extent to which workers (rather than 
managers) control the allocation of tasks and the pace of work in the factory. We find the worker 
autonomy is also significantly increased by higher competition and greater trust.  
 
VII. FIRM-LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY AND DECENTRALIZATION 
A key question in analyzing firm organizational structures is the impact this could have on firm and 
national productivity. We have suggested that one route through which social capital matters is 
through allowing more output to be allocated to larger firms. In this section we examine our survey 
micro data to examine a second route – the within firm association of decentralization with 
productivity. 
 
Consider the basic firm production function
47:  
                                          it it i D it C it K it L it v Z D c k l y + + + + + = ' γ α α α α                                                        
where Y = deflated sales, L = labor, K = non-IT capital and C = IT capital of firm i at time t, and 
lower case letters denote natural logarithms, e.g. y = ln(Y). The Z’s are a number of other controls 
that will affect productivity such as workforce characteristics (the proportion of workers with a 
degree) and firm characteristics (firm age, whether the firm is listed), a complete set of three digit 
industry dummies and country dummies.  The crucial variable for us this basic specification is the 
decentralization index, denoted D.  
 
                                                 
46 In our sample we found that multinationals had on average 93.8% of managers from the location country, 4.1% from 
the source country and 2.1% from all other countries. Hence, medium sized manufacturing firms appear to typically 
employ domestic managers in their overseas subsidiaries. 
47 There is an extensive literature on the interpretation of the coefficients in these equations. In particular, in the absence 
of firm-specific prices the coefficients on the factor inputs should be interpreted as a mix of “true” productivity 
parameters and a mark-up term (e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008).   30
In column (1) of Table 8 we run a basic specification with only capital, labor and decentralization, 
and find a large significant coefficient on decentralization. The coefficient suggests a one standard 
deviation increase in decentralization is associated with a 10% increase in productivity. In column 
(2) we include the full set of control variables, including the education of the workforce, country and 
industry controls. In this case the coefficient on decentralization falls substantially to 0.023 and is 
now significant at the 10%. This suggests that there is weak direct association of decentralization 
with higher productivity.  
 
But while decentralization may only have a small direct association with productivity, it interacts 
with individual factors of production. To investigate this we need to augment our estimating 
equation to include interactions with all factor inputs: 
it it i it CD i it KD i it LD i D it C it K it L it v Z D c D k D l D c k l y + + + + + + + + = ' ) * ( ) * ( ) * ( γ α α α α α α α                                     
We do this because of a growing prior literature suggesting that decentralized firms may use 
Information Technologies (IT) more effectively.
48 One rationalization is that to effectively use new 
technologies they need local flexibility to experiment. In a decentralized organization that can be 
achieved locally, while in a centralized organization this will have to be enforced from the centre 
which may be much harder to do.  We also include interactions with employment and non-IT capital 
because the organization of the firm may also influence the productivity of these factors.  
 
In column (3) we see the IT *decentralization interaction is positive and significant, consistent with 
this prior literature that IT is more effectively used in decentralized firms. In column (4) we re-run 
this estimation including a full set of firm-level fixed effects to control for any other unobserved 
cross-sectional factors, and again find a positive and significant coefficient (note that the linear time 
invariant variables are not separately identified from the firm specific effects). In column (5) we add 
an interaction between decentralization and non-IT capital and find a significant negative 
coefficient, suggesting more traditional non-IT capital may actually be better utilized in a more 




                                                 
48 See, for example, Bresnahan et al (2002) and Bartel, Ichinowski and Shaw (2007). 
49 For example, the point estimate (standard-error) on running a similar regression for employment interacted with 
decentralization was 0.0188 (0.0389), and for skills interaction with decentralization was -0.153 (0.105).   31
The magnitude of the coefficient on the IT and decentralization interaction at 0.032 is quantitatively 
important. The reason is the real IT capital stock has been growing by about 8% a year faster than 
non-IT capital inputs in Europe and the US
50, so that a firm (or country) with one standard-deviation 
higher decentralization would have about 0.26 percentage points faster annual productivity growth. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of our paper is analyzing the argument that social capital enhances macro-economic 
performance through affecting the internal organization of firms. High trust and strong rule of law 
regions are able to sustain larger firms and industrial sectors that require decentralization; further 
companies in these regions also have a higher degree of delegation given their size and industry. 
Trust is even important when we look at subsidiaries of multinational firms – delegation is much 
more likely for pairs of countries with high bilateral trust. Trust and rule of law enhance national 
productivity because efficient firms need to decentralize when they grow, and recent work has 
demonstrated that such reallocation is a key factor in aggregate productivity both for developed and 
developing countries.  
 
A second contribution of our paper is to provide some data infrastructure for the analysis of firm 
organization. Despite many theoretical advances, the empirical literature on organizational 
economics lacks comparable measures of firms’ internal organization across countries. By collecting 
original data on decentralization across many thousands of firms in twelve countries we start to 
address this lacuna. We find that American and Northern European firms are much more 
decentralized than those from Southern Europe and Asia. These cross country differences can be 
largely accounted for by four key factors: trust, the Rule of Law, hierarchical religion and 
competition.  
 
Since the importance of decentralization appears to be growing, countries with a comparative 
advantage in decentralization (whether through high trust, stronger Rule of Law and less hierarchical 
religion) such as the US and Northern Europe are likely to have benefit disproportionately. If the 
trend towards rapid technical change and greater competition in markets continues this is likely to 
give productivity advantages to such countries.  
                                                 
50 Calculated from 1994 to 2004 using the Groningen Growth and Development Centre dataset for Europe and the US.   32
 
There are many future directions for this work. First, some of the findings need to be matched up 
with new developments in theory (e.g. Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008, have examined co-
ordination models that could rationalize the competition results). Second, the role of changes in ICT 
needs to be unpacked. We have simply used a composite hardware measure as is standard in the 
literature but Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have correctly stressed that 
the impact of falls in information costs on delegation are often the opposite of falls in 
communication costs in “cognitive” models of the firm. This model can potentially be empirically 
tested using the kind of data developed here.   33
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We typically observe just one plant per firm & assume this is representative,
but sometimes we sample more than 1 plant
Example C:
US Domestic Firm






Some firms have a site with multiple “buildings”, such as a CHQ and production 
plants. We only keep these if the plant manager is not the CEO, as decentralization 
is still possible even if the CEO is on-site (think of Universities, which typically have 
one-site but Departmental Heads have some autonomy from the Dean). We also 
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CHQ and the plant manager.
FIGURE 1 – EXAMPLES OF FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
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Notes: The graph shows median level of trust. The vertical bars denote minimum and maximum levels.  
 
























Notes: The graph shows median level of hierarchical religion. The vertical bars denote minimum and maximum levels.      40
FIGURE 3 - AVERAGE DECENTRALIZATION BY COUNTRY 
 














Notes: The graph plots average the z-scored decentralization index by country, measured as the plant manager’s degree of autonomy over hiring, investment, products 
and prices. N=3549. Higher scores indicate more decentralization.   41
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NOTES: These are the distributions of the decentralization index, which measures the degree of autonomy of plant 
managers over hiring, investment, products and prices. N=3549. Higher scores indicate more decentralization. 
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Notes: The y-axis is the average level of autonomy of plant managers over hiring, investment, products and pricing by 
country. The x-axis is Hofstede’s (1980) Power Distance Index.   42
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Fiscal Decentralization Index
 
Notes: The y-axis is the average level of autonomy of plant managers over hiring, investment, products and pricing by 
country. The x-axis is Arzaghi and Henderson’s (2003) Fiscal Decentralization Index. 
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Fitted decentralization (by region)
 
Notes: The y-axis is average regional decentralization z-score, measured as the average scores for firms within the region 
on their plant manager’s degree of autonomy over hiring, investment, products and pricing. The x-axis is regional 
decentralization z-score predicted from our measures of regional trust, regional share of hierarchical religion and country 
Rule of Law.   43
 
TABLE 1 
DECENTRALIZATION AND TRUST  
 
 Dependent variable: Decentralization  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Trust (region)  1.115** 0.857***  0.795***  0.699** 
Trust measured in plant's region of location  (0.437) (0.303)  (0.303)  (0.317) 
Rule of Law (country)   0.515***  0.531***   
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)   (0.125)  (0.121)   
Plant Skills       0.085*** 
% Plant employees with a College degree       (0.015) 
Firm Size     0.106***  0.052** 
ln(Firm employment)     (0.021)  (0.022) 
Plant employment     0.119***  0.089*** 
Plant employees as a % of firm     (0.025)  (0.030) 
Foreign Multinational       0.157*** 
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a foreign multinational       (0.058) 
Domestic Multinational       0.018 
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a domestic multinational       (0.040) 
        
Observations  3,660 3,660  3,660  3,660 
Country controls (2)  no yes  yes - 
Regional controls (2)  no no  no  yes 
Industry dummies (112)  no no  no  yes 
Country dummies (12)  no no  no  yes 
Other controls (60)  no no  no  yes 
 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the decentralization z-
score index, measured by plant manager’s autonomy over hiring, investment, products and pricing. Estimation by OLS with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by the firm's region of location. TRUST measures the 
percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted” in the firm's region of location.  
RULE OF LAW measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The index is 
compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman et al, 2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. “Other controls” include a dummy 
for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and 
“Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took 
place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure, the duration of the interview, and 4 dummies for 
missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability). Country controls are GDP per capita and population. Regional 
controls are GDP per capita and population in the region.  Regressions weighted by the share of World Values Survey 
respondents in the region in the country.   44
TABLE 2 
DECENTRALIZATION AND TRUST IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
 
Dependent variable:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Decentralization  OLS    OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
Sample  All firms    All Foreign Multinationals European  Foreign  Multinationals 
             
Trust (region)  0.627**   0.451  0.362    0.131     
Trust measured in plant's region 
of location  (0.309)  (0.602)  (0.858)    (1.999)     
Trust (country of origin)      0.767**  0.729**  0.206     
Trust measured in firm's country 
of origin      (0.298)  (0.332)  (0.556)     
Bilateral trust          1.711**  2.025*  2.011 
Trust of people from country of 
origin for people in country of 
location 
        (0.721)  (1.112)  (1.571) 
Plant Skills  0.083***  0.190*** 0.189*** 0.203*** 0.161**  0.228**  0.228***
% Plant employees with a College 
degree  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.076)  (0.109)  (0.060) 
Firm Size  0.057***   0.024  0.025  0.022  0.070  0.049  0.049 
ln(Firm Employment)  (0.022)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.101)  (0.127)  (0.075) 
Plant Employment  0.104***   0.083 0.082** 0.103** 0.146 0.169  0.169**
Plant employees as a % of firm  (0.029)  (0.062)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.094)  (0.111)  (0.080) 
Foreign MNE  0.154***           
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a 
foreign multinational  (0.053)           
Domestic MNE  0.018           
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a 
domestic multinational  (0.037)           
First stage F-test  
Instruments (Somatic dist. 
Religious dist.)           
15.20 
 
Observations  3,660   866 866 866 282 282  282
Regional controls (2)  yes    yes yes yes yes  -  - 
Industry dummies (21)  yes    yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Country dummies (12)  yes    yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Other controls (60)  yes    yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Country of origin controls (2)  no    no yes yes  yes  yes yes 
Regional dummies (105)  no    no no yes    no  yes yes 
Country of origin dummies 
(25)  no    no no no no  yes yes 
Clustering  Region  Region Cty  origin  Cty  origin  Cty origin  
by location 
Cty origin  
by location 
Cty origin  
by location 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index, 
measured by plant manager’s degree of autonomy over hiring, investment, products and pricing. Column (1) includes all firms; Columns (2)-
(7) include only foreign multinationals. Estimation by OLS in columns (1)-(6) and IV in column (7). Instruments are “religious diversity” and 
“somatic distance” between each country pair. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered as noted: “cty origin by location” indicates 
clustering within each country origin by region of location cell. TRUST measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement 
“most people can be trusted” in the region of firm's location or country of origin. BILATERAL TRUST measures the percentage of people 
from country of origin who report to “trust a lot” people living in the country of firm’s location.  “Other controls” include a dummy for 
whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and “Noise controls” (these 
include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the 
manager’s seniority and tenure, the duration of the interview, and 4 dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability). 
Regional controls are GDP per capita and population in the region.   Country of origin controls are GDP per capita and population.  Weighted 




Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is ln( mean employees per 
firm) in the population of all manufacturing firms in that country region. SAMPLE reports the size cut off for inclusion in 
the sample – for example in column (1) all firms with 100+ employees were used to calculate the log mean employees per 
firm. TRUST measures the percentage of individuals in the region's country of location who agreed with the statement 
“most people can be trusted”. RULE OF LAW measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence in the firm's country of location. The index is compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman et al, 2007), and 
ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Regional controls are GDP per capita, population in the region and % of employees with a 





FIRM SIZE AND TRUST 
 
Dependent variable: 
ln(mean employees per firm) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










       
Trust (region)  2.216*** 1.851**  1.713*  1.597*  1.540* 
Trust measured in firm's region of location  (0.478) (0.889) (0.874) (0.857) (0.858) 
Rule of Law (country)  0.476***      
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)  (0.079)      
       
Observations  110 110 110 110 110 
Regional controls  no yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies  no yes yes yes yes   46
TABLE 4 
IMPLIED INDUSTRY DECENTRALIZATION  
 
Dependent variable: 
implied industry decentralization  
    
(1) (2)  (3) 
      
Trust (region)  0.100** 0.099***  0.095 
Trust measured in plant's region of location  (0.029) (0.031)  (0.073) 
Rule of Law (country)   0.027**   
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)   (0.014)   
      
Observations  98 98  98 
Regional controls  yes yes  yes 
Country dummies  no no  yes 
      
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is “implied industry 
decentralization”, measured as the industry share of employment in each region by SIC2 multiplied by that decentralization 
value for that SIC2 industry in the UK. The regression sample is all countries except the UK. Hence, a high value indicates 
a large share of employment in the region in industries which are decentralized in the UK. Estimation by OLS with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. TRUST measures the percentage of individuals in the region's country of location 
who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted”. RULE OF LAW measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence in the firm's country of location. The index is compiled by the World 
Bank (Kauffman et al, 2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Regional controls are GDP per capita, population in the 
region and % of employees with a degree.   47
TABLE 5 














    All Firms  Fr, Ger, Pol, 
Sw & UK 
Foreign 
Multinationals 
Hierarchical  (region)    -0.484*** -0.268**  -0.494**  -0.764***   
% of Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox in 
plant's region of location 
  (0.163) (0.124) (0.199)  (0.258)   
Rule of Law (country)     0.292***      
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)     (0.063)      
Hierarchical  (country of origin)          -0.381** 
% of Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox in 
plant's country of origin  
        (0.155) 
Trust (region)       0.797**  0.605  
Trust measured in plant's region of location       (0.327)  (0.381)   
Plant Skills       0.085***  0.085***  0.207*** 
% Plant employees with a College degree        (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.041) 
Firm Size       0.052**  0.097***  0.019 
ln(Firm employment)       (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.033) 
Plant Employment       0.090***  0.119**  0.097** 
Plant employees as a % of firm        (0.030)  (0.056)  (0.037) 
Foreign Multinational       0.156***  0.115  
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a foreign 
multinational 
     (0.057)  (0.080)   
Domestic Multinational       0.021  0.083  
firm belongs  to a domestic multinational 
 
     (0.040)  (0.064)   
First stage F-test 
Instrument (1) 
       50.36 
Reformation 
 
Observations   3,660  3,660  3,660  1,541  866 
Regional controls (2)    yes yes yes  yes  yes 
Industry dummies (112)    no  no  yes  yes (21)  yes (21) 
Country dummies (12)    no no yes no  yes 
Other controls (60)    no no yes  yes
 (16) yes 
Country of origin controls (2)    no no no  no  yes 
Regional dummies (105)    no no no  no  yes 
Clustering   Region  Region  Region  Region  Country  of 
origin 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation by OLS in all columns except (4). The dependent 
variable is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s degree of autonomy over hiring, investment, products and 
pricing.  Standard errors clustered as noted in the table. IV estimation in column (4) uses whether the region accepted the Reformation as 
the instrument, covering France, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the UK. HIERARCHICAL is the percentage of Catholics, Muslims and 
Orthodox living in the firm's region of location, or country of origin. RULE OF LAW measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence in the firm's country of location. The index is compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman et al, 2007), 
and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. TRUST measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can be 
trusted” in the firm's region of location. “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether 
the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to 
control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure, the duration of 
the interview, and 4 dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability). In column (4) the noise controls do not 
include the interviewer dummies. Regional controls are GDP per capita and population in the region (included in all columns). Country 
of origin controls are GDP per capita and population.  Weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the 
country.   48
 
TABLE 6 
COMPETITION AND DECENTRALIZATION  
Dependent variable: 
decentralization  
       
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Import Penetration  0.131***  0.156**      
(3 years lagged)  (0.050)  (0.071)      
Industry Lerner Competition index     5.705*** 2.937***    
(3 years lagged)     (0.850)  (1.056)     
Number of Competitors         0.122***  0.099***
(0=none, 1=between 1 and 4, 2=more than 4)         (0.036)  (0.038) 
Trust (region)    1.103**  0.719**  0.815** 
Trust measured in plant’s region of location    (0.469)  (0.346)  (0.343) 
Hierarchical  (region)    -0.344   -0.490**  -0.514** 
% of Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox in 
firm's region of location    (0.220)  (0.200)  (0.213) 
Plant Skills    0.077***  0.084***  0.085***
% Plant employees with a College degree    (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Firm Size    0.075***  0.053**  0.050** 
Ln(Firm Employment)    (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Plant Employment    0.129***  0.090***  0.088***
Plant employees as a % of firm    (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
Foreign Multinational    0.187***  0.150***  0.161***
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a foreign 
multinational    (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Domestic Multinational    0.043  0.018  0.022 
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a domestic 
multinational    (0.063)  (0.053)  (0.049) 
Observations  2,508  2,508 3,660 3,660 3,660 3,600 
Regional controls (2)  no  yes no yes no yes 
Industry dummies (112)  no yes no yes no yes 
Country dummies (12)  no  yes no yes no yes 














Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index, 
measured by plant manager’s degree of autonomy over hiring, investment, products and pricing. Estimation by OLS with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the same level as the relevant competition measure (as noted in the table). "Lerner" 
is the median of 1-(profit/sales) in the three digit industry in the country of location averaged between 2000 and 2003 (computed from 
Amadeus and Oriana). Import Penetration is the ratio of imports over production in the two digit industry (ISIC) in the country of 
location averaged between 1999 and 2003 (computed from OECD STAN Database). “Number of competitors” is taken from the survey 
and is the number of rivals the manager perceives he faces.  “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a 
dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer 
dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority 
and tenure, the duration of the interview, and 4 dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability). TRUST 
measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted” in the firm's region of location. 
Regional controls are GDP per capita and population in the region.   49
 
TABLE 7 
DECENTRALIZATION REGRESSION ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 





















decentralization   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Number of Competitors  0.099***  0.035  0.167***  0.101** 0.108** 0.122** 0.092** 0.090**  0.098*  0.093* 
  (0.031) (0.054) (0.046) (0.044) (0.053) (0.056) (0.036) (0.035) (0.052)  (0.050) 
Trust (region)  0.815**  0.326 1.256*** 0.380 1.339***  0.825* 0.878**  1.324***  0.817*  0.902* 
  (0.327) (0.472) (0.408) (0.387) (0.492) (0.420) (0.352) (0.434) (0.427)  (0.514) 
Hierarchical  (region)  -0.514**  -0.484 -0.556***  -0.424*  -0.496* -0.581** -0.552* -0.543**  -0.487  -0.515** 
  (0.207) (0.467) (0.188) (0.245) (0.288) (0.230) (0.297) (0.220) (0.302)  (0.227) 
             
Observations  3,660 1,462 2,198 2,280 1,380 2,094 3,112 2,723 1,974 1,686
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Dependent variable is decentralization. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “Number of competitors” is taken from the survey 
and is the number of rivals the manager perceives he faces.  HIERARCHICAL is the percentage of Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians living in the country, region of country of origin. TRUST measures the 
percentage of individuals in the firm's country of location who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted”. Controls include a dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on 
the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s 
seniority and tenure, the duration of the interview, and 4 dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability).  Regional controls are GDP per capita and population in the region. Standard errors are 
clustered as detailed in the table. All columns weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country. All columns include a full set of country dummies (12) and industry dummies (  112). 
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TABLE 7 
 DECENTRALIZATION REGRESSION ROBUSTNESS CHECKS (CONTINUED) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Dependent variable is decentralization. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “Number of competitors” is taken from the 
survey and is the number of rivals the manager perceives he faces.  HIERARCHICAL is the percentage of Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians living in the country, region of country of origin. TRUST measures 
the percentage of individuals in the firm's country of location who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted”. Controls include a dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO 
is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the 
manager’s seniority and tenure, the duration of the interview, and 4 dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability).  Regional controls are GDP per capita and population in the region. Standard 
errors are clustered as detailed in the table. All columns weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country. All columns include a full set of country dummies (12) and industry 
dummies (112). 
Sample/Experiment  Controlling for 
Management 
Foreign MNEs  Foreign 
MNEs 
Foreign MNEs, 
all managers local 
Drop Islam from 
hierarchical group 
Dependent variable is 
worker autonomy 
Dependent variable: decentralization :  (11)  (12) (13)  (14) (15)  (16) 
Number of Competitors  0.071** 0.116 0.117 0.182 0.099*** 0.077**
  (0.028) (0.135)  (0.138)  (0.133) (0.031)  (0.032) 
Trust (region)  0.775** 0.809  0.791  1.106  0.825**  0.415 
  (0.322) (0.987)  (0.990)  (1.124) (0.329)  (0.325) 
Trust (country of origin)  -0.466** 0.996***  1.012***  0.877*     
  (0.199) (0.347)  (0.347)  (0.472)    
Hierarchical  (region)  0.071** -1.012**  -0.991**  -0.777  -0.514** -0.230 
  (0.028) (0.390)  (0.416)  (0.479) (0.209)  (0.199) 
Management  0.177*** 0.197***  0.198***  0.183***  0.085***  0.075*** 
  (0.039) (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.042) (0.015)  (0.020) 
Global assets of the ultimate owner  0.008 
     (0.016)       
            
Observations  3,659 508  508  439  3,660  3,568   51
 
TABLE 8 
DECENTRALIZATION AND FIRM-LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Sales)   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
       
Decentralization  0.100*** 0.023*  0.046**     
Firm level decentralization z-score  (0.015) (0.014) (0.021)  
Ln(Employment)  0.594*** 0.665*** 0.705*** 0.445*** 0.438*** 
ln(number of employees)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.076) (0.074) 
Ln(Capital)  0.406*** 0.336*** 0.297*** 0.373*** 0.390*** 
ln (net tangible fixed assets)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.044) (0.043) 
Ln(Skills)   0.060***  0.049**     
ln (% employees with a degree)   (0.013)  (0.019)    
Ln (IT)     0.126***  0.073***  0.070*** 
ln (number of PCs per employee)     (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Decentralization*ln(IT)     0.047***  0.032*  0.035** 
Decentralization and IT interaction     (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Decentralization*ln(Capital)       -0.046* 
Decentralization and Capital interaction   (0.026)
       
Firms  1,674 1,674  713  713  713 
Observations  11,690 11,690  3,509  3,509  3,509 
Country and industry controls (122)  no yes yes yes yes 
Other controls (62)  no yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  no no no yes  yes 
 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation by OLS with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is log (sales). DECENTRALIZATION z-score index, measured by the degree of plant 
manager’s autonomy over hiring, investment, products and pricing.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. “Country and 
industry” controls include a full set of country and three digit industry dummies. OTHER CONTROLS includes a full set of noise 
controls (the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure, the duration 
of the interview, and 4 dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and reliability) and controls for accounts 










A1. Firm-level Accounting Databases 
 
Our sampling frame was based on the Bureau van Dijk (BVD) Amadeus dataset for Europe 
(France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the U.K.), on BVD Icarus for the US, on 
CMIE Firstsource dataset for India, and on the BVD Oriana dataset for China and Japan. These 
databases all provide sufficient information on companies to conduct a stratified telephone survey 
(company name, address and a size indicator). These databases also typically have accounting 
information on employment, sales and capital. Apart from size, we did not insist on having 
accounting information to form the sampling population, however. 
 
Amadeus and Firstsource are constructed from a range of sources, primarily the National registries 
of companies (such as Companies House in the UK and the Registry of Companies in India). 
Icarus is constructed from the Dun & Bradstreet database, which is a private database of over 5 
million US trading locations built up from credit records, business telephone directories and direct 
research. Oriana is constructed from Huaxia credit in China and Teikoku Database in Japan, 
covering all public and all private firms with one of the following: 150 or more employees, 10 
million US$ of sales or 20 million US$ of assets. 
 
In addition to using these accounting databases for the sampling frame we also use them to 
conduct the analysis of firm size in Table 3. Since our measure of decentralization focuses on the 
delegation of power between the company headquarters and the plant manager, firm size is the 
appropriate concept to use rather than plant size. Census data do not report firm sizes on a 
consistent basis across which is why we use the BVD and CMIE datasets. We discuss issues of 
representativeness below in sub-section A2. 
 
 
A2. The Organizational Survey  
 
In every country the sampling frame for the organization survey was all firms with a 
manufacturing primary industry code with between 100 and 5,000 employees on average over the 
most recent three years of data (typically 2002 to 2004)
51. In Japan and China we used all 
manufacturing firms with 150 to 5000 employees since Oriana only samples firms with over 150 
employees, while in Portugal we supplemented the sample with firms with 75 to 100 employees.
52 
We checked the results by conditioning on common size bands (above 150 in all countries). 
 
                                                 
51 In the US only the most recent year of employment is provided. In India employment is not reported for private 
firms, so for these companies we used forecast employment, predicted from their total assets (which are reported) 
using the coefficients from regressing ln(employees) on log (assets) for public firms. 
52 Note that the Oriana database does include firms with less than 150 employees if they meet the sales or assets 
criteria, but we excluded this to avoid using a selected sample.   53
Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list of firms from the sampling frame. This 
should therefore be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms. The size of this sampling 
frame by country is shown in Table A4, together with information on firm size. Looking at Table 
A4 two points are worth highlighting on the sampling frame. First, the size of the sampling frame 
appears broadly proportional to the absolute size of each country’s manufacturing base, with 
China, the US and India having the most firms and Sweden, Greece and Portugal the fewest
53. 
Second, China has the largest firms on average, presumably reflecting both the higher size cut-off 
for its sampling frame (150 employees versus 100 employees for other countries) and also the 
presence of many current and ex state-owned enterprises (11% in the survey are still Government 
owned). When we condition on the sample of firms with more than 150 employees in all 
countries, median employment for Chinese firms is still relatively high, but lower than the US, UK 
and Sweden. Third, Greece and India have a much higher share of publicly quoted firms then the 
other countries, with this presumably reflecting their more limited provision of data on privately 
held firms. Because of this potential bias across countries will control for firm size and listing 
status in all the main regressions. 
 
In addition to randomly surveying from the sampling frame described above we also resurveyed 
the firms we interviewed in the 2004 survey wave used in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). This 
was a sample of 732 firms from France, Germany, the UK and the US, with a manufacturing 
primary industry code and 50 to 10,000 employees (on average between 2000 and 2003). This 
sample was drawn from the Amadeus dataset for Europe and the Compustat dataset for the U.S. 
Only companies with accounting data were selected. So, for the UK and France this sampling 
frame was very similar to the 2006 sampling frame. For Germany it is more heavily skewed 
towards publicly quoted firms since smaller privately held firms do not report balance sheet 
information. For the US it comprised only publicly quoted firms. As a result when we present 
results we always include controls for firm size. As a robustness test we drop the firms that were 
resurveyed from 2004. These resurveyed firms were randomly distributed among the relevant 
country interviewers. 
  
The Representativeness of the Sampling Frame 
 
The accounting databases are used to generate our organizational survey and also used directly in 
the analysis of the firm size distribution in Table 3. How does this compare to Census data? Table 
A5 compares the number of employees for different size bands from our sample with the figures 
for the corresponding manufacturing populations obtained from national Census Bureau data from 
each of the twelve countries. Unfortunately, figures for the population distributions are not 
available from every country in the same format, but all our countries do report the number of 
employees in enterprises with over 50 or more employees (except the US where the threshold is 
20 or 100) so we report this. 
 
Note that there are several reasons for mismatch between Census data and firm level accounts. 
First, even though we only use unconsolidated firm accounts, employment may included some 
jobs in overseas branches. Second, the time of when employment is recorded in a Census year will 
                                                 
53 The size of the manufacturing sector can be obtained from http://laborsta.ilo.org/, a database maintained by ILO. 
Indian data can be obtained from Indiastat, from the “Employment in Industry” table.   54
differ from that recorded in firm accounts (see base of each column in Table A5). Third, the 
precise definition of “enterprise” in the Census may not correspond to the “firm” in company 
accounts (see notes in table for exact definitions). Fourth, we keep firms whose primary industry is 
manufacturing whereas Census data includes only plants whose primary industry code is 
manufacturing. Fifth, there may be duplication of employment in accounting databases due to the 
treatment of consolidated accounts
54. Finally, reporting of employment is not mandatory for the 
accounts of all firms in all countries. This was particularly a problem for Indian and Japanese 
firms, so for these countries we imputed the missing employment numbers using a sales 
regression.  
 
Despite these potential differences, the broad picture that from Table A5 is that in eight countries 
the sample matches up reasonably with the population of medium sized manufacturing firms 
(being within 17% above or below the Census total employment number). This suggests our 
sampling frame covers near to the population of all firms for most countries.  
 
In two countries the coverage from accounting databases underestimates the aggregate: the 
Swedish data covers only 62% of Census data and the Portuguese accounting database covers 
72%. This is due to incomplete coverage in ORBIS of these smaller nations. In the US and Japan 
the accounting databases appears to overestimate the employment of manufacturing firms 
compared to Census data, by about 36%. We think this is due to some double counting of the 
employment of subsidiaries due to imperfect recording of the consolidation markers in Japanese 
and US accounts. 
 
These issues will be a problem if our sampling frame is non-randomly omitting firms – for 
example under-representing smaller firms – because it would bias our cross-country comparisons. 
We try a couple of approaches to try and address this. First, in almost all the tables of results we 
include country fixed-effects to try to control for any differences across countries in sample 
selection bias. Hence, our key results are identified by within country and region variation. 
Second, in our quantification analysis (sub-section VI.C) when we compare across countries we 
control for size, public listing status and industry. This should help to condition on the types of 
factors that lead to under/over sampling of firms. Since these factors explain only a limited share 
of cross country variation in decentralization this suggests this differential sampling bias is not 
likely to be particularly severe. Finally, we also present experiments where we drop the four 
possibly problematic countries (Japan, Portugal, Sweden and the US) from the analysis to show 
that the results are robust. In the specification of column (2) in Table 3 the coefficient on trust 
actually rose to 2.048 (standard error = 0.961) even though we now have only 81 regions. 
 
The Survey Response Rate 
 
As shown in Table A6 of the firms we contacted 44.9% took part in the survey: a high success rate 
given the voluntary nature of participation. Of the remaining firms 16.8% refused to be surveyed, 
while the remaining 38.3% were in the process of being scheduled when the survey ended.  
                                                 
54 Table A5 is built omitting all consolidated accounts to avoid duplications. Still, for some companies the 
consolidated accounts marker is sometimes missing so that duplications might still be present causing a “double 
counting” problem.    55
 
The reason for this high share of ‘scheduling in progress’ firms was the need for interviewers to 
keep a portfolio of firms who they cycle though when trying to set up interviews. Since 
interviewers only ran an average of 2.8 interviews a day the majority of their time was spent trying 
to contact managers to schedule future interviews. For scheduling it was efficient for interviewers 
to keep a stock of between 100 to 500 firms to cycle through. The optimal level of this stock 
varied by the country – in the US and UK many managers operated voicemail, so that large stocks 
of firms were needed. In Japan after two weeks the team switched from working Japanese hours 
(midnight to 8am) to Japanese afternoons and UK morning (4am till midday), which left large 
stocks of contacted firms in Japan.
55 In Continental Europe, in contrast, managers typically had 
personnel assistants rather than voicemail, who wanted to see Government endorsement materials 
before connecting with the managers. So each approach was more time consuming, requiring a 
smaller stock of firms. 
 
The ratio of successful interviews to rejections (ignoring ‘scheduling in progress’) is above 1 in 
every country. Hence, managers typically agreed to the survey proposition when interviewers were 
able to connect with them. This agreement ratio is lowest in China and Japan. There were two 
reasons for this: first, the Chinese and Japanese firms did appear to be genuinely more willing to 
refuse to be interviewed; and second, the time-zone meant that our interviewers could not run talk 
during the Chinese or Japanese morning; which sometimes led to rejections if managers were too 
busy to talk in the afternoon. 
 
Table A7 analyses the probability of being interviewed.
56 In all columns, we compare the 
probability of running an interview conditional on contacting the firm, so including rejections and 
‘scheduling in progress’ firms in the baseline. The decision to accept is uncorrelated with revenues 
per worker, firm age and listed status. The probability of being interviewed is also uncorrelated 
with the average level of trust and the percentage of hierarchical religions in the region. Large 
firms and multinationals did appear to be more predisposed to agree to be interviewed, although 
the size of this effect if not large – multinationals were about 11 percentage points more likely to 
agree to the interview and firms about 10 percentage points more likely for a doubling in size. 
Firms that were contacted earlier on in the survey were also significantly more likely to end up 
being interviewed, with firms contacted at the beginning of the survey over 8 percentage points 
more likely to be interviewed than those contacted towards the end (3 months later). The reason is 
that firms contacted early on in the survey were subsequently contacted many more times as 
interviewers cycled through their stocks of ‘scheduling in progress firms’. Finally, compared to 
the US, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden had significantly 
higher conditional acceptance rate –– while China had a significantly lower acceptance rate. 
Column (2) shows that the likelihood of a contacted firm eventually being interviewed is also 
uncorrelated with return on capital employed, a basic profits measure. 
 
                                                 
55 After two weeks of the Japanese team working midnight to 8am it became clear this schedule was not sustainable 
due to the unsociability of the hours, with one of the Japanese interviewers quitting. The rest of the team then 
switched to working 4am until noon.  
56 Note this sample is smaller than the total survey sample because some firms do not report data for certain 
explanatory variables, for example US private firms do not report sales.   56
So, in summary, respondents were not significantly more productive or profitable than non-
responders. Firms contacted earlier on in the survey process were more likely to end up being 
interviewed. Respondents did tend to be slightly larger and more likely to be a multinational 
subsidiary, but were not more likely to be stock-market listed or older. Chinese and Japanese firms 
less likely to respond and European firms more likely to respond. Note, however, that we address 




Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term 
debt, market values (for quoted firms) and wages (where available) came from BVD Amadeus 
dataset for Europe (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the U.K.), on BVD 
Icarus for the US, on CMIE Firstsource dataset for India, and on the BVD Oriana dataset for 
China and Japan. 
 
BVD and CMIE also have extensive information on ownership structure, so we can use this to 
identify whether the firm was part of a multinational enterprise. We also asked specific questions 
on the multinational status of the firm (whether it owned plants aboard and the country where the 
parent company is headquartered) to be able to distinguish domestic multinationals from foreign 
multinationals. 
 
We collected many variables through our survey including information on plant size, skills, 
organization, etc. as described in the main text. We asked the manager to estimate how many 
competitors he thought he faced (top-coded at 10 or more) which was used to construct the firm-
level competition variable (see next sub-section for the other industry-level competition 
measures). We also collected management practices data in the survey. These were scored 
following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), with practices grouped into four 
areas:  operations (three practices), monitoring (five practices), targets (five practices) and 
incentives (five practices). The shop-floor operations section focuses on the introduction of lean 
manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes improvements and the rationale behind 
introductions of improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the tracking of performance of 
individuals, reviewing performance, and consequence management. The targets section examines 
the type of targets, the realism of the targets, the transparency of targets and the range and 
interconnection of targets. Finally, the incentives section includes promotion criteria, pay and 
bonuses, and fixing or firing bad performers, where best practice is deemed the approach that 
gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort. Our management measure uses the un-
weighted average of the z-scores of all 18 dimensions. 
 
A.3 Industries and Industry level data 
Our basic industry code is the U.S. SIC (1997) three digit level - which is our common industry 
definition in all countries. We allocate each firm to its main three digit sector (based on sales). For 
the 3,601 firms in the sample we have 134 unique three-digit industries. There are at least ten 
sampled firms in each industry for 96.9% of the sample. 
 
The “Lerner index of competition” constructed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), as the mean of (1 - 
profit/sales) in the entire database (excluding the surveyed firms themselves) for every country   57
industry pair. Profits are defined as EBIT (earning before interest and taxation) to include the costs 
of labor, materials and capital but exclude any financing or tax costs. The five year period 2000 to 
2004 is used in every country to ensure comparability across countries (since earlier data is not 
available in Oriana). In the US and India private firms do not provide profits data so the index was 
constructed from the population of all publicly listed firms, obtained from Compustat for the US 
and the CMIE Prowess dataset for India. 
 
 
A.4 Regional and National Data 
 
Trust: the World Values Survey 
The regional trust and religion variables have been calculated from the World Values Survey 
(WVS). The WVS is a cross-country project coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the 
University of Michigan, under the direction of Ronald Inglehart. Each wave carries out 
representative surveys of the basic values and beliefs of individuals in a large cross-section of 
countries. The questionnaire contains answers to specific questions about religion and social 
attitudes, including several question on generalized and specific trust (e.g. trust in the family, 
government etc.), as well as detailed information on the social and education background of the 
respondents (age, income, education). The key question we use is the standard one:   
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?”  
 
The WVS data can be downloaded freely from the WVS website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
For the purposes of our analysis, we use only individual entries with information on the 
respondent’ region of residence. We pool together data relative to four successive waves of data 
collection (1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004. We use the WVS for all countries 
with the exception of Greece, for which the regional breakdown provided by the WVS is poor. 
Luckily, we can build regional aggregates of trust and religion using the European Social Survey 
(ESS, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org), a biennial multi-country survey covering over 30 
European nations, and including questions on trust and religion. The wording of the trust question 
is identical to the one used by the WVS, although the answers are coded on a scale from 1 to 10, 
instead of the discrete 0/1 choices adopted by the WVS. To ensure comparability between 
countries, we convert into 1s all the answers greater than 5. The first round of the ESS was fielded 
in 2002/2003, the second in 2004/2005 and the third in 2006/2007. We pool across all waves of 
the ESS. The frequencies by country and wave are shown in Table A8. 
 
European Commission Bilateral Trust Data 
This comes directly from Table 1; panel B of Guiso et al. (2009). They averaged over multiple 
waves of a Eurobarometer survey carried out for the European Commission from the 1970s 
onwards. The question is: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, 
not very much trust, or no trust at all.” This was asked to all European Union Member States about 
each other and a number of other countries (including the US,  China and Japan). We allocated the 
bilateral trust measure across the multinational subsidiaries included in our sample using 
information on the country where the parent company is headquartered and on the country where 
the subsidiary itself is located. So, for example, the measure of bilateral trust reported by Swedish   58
people towards Italians would be allocated to the subsidiary of a Swedish multinational located in 
Italy. 
 
Regional Firm Size and Share of Manufacturing Employment 
Average regional firm size and the industry share of employment in each region by SIC2 were 
computed using employment data on the population of all public and private firms included in the 
BVD and CMIE accounting databases described above. The data refers mostly to 2006 (earlier 
years of the accounting data have been used whenever 2006 was not available, as long as the firm 
appeared to be still active). Since the accounting databases did not always provide information on 
the region of location of the firm, each firm was allocated to a region or state according to the 
headquarter postcode whenever this was available. If the postcode was not available, information 
on the city of location was used to map the firm into a specific region or state. With this 
procedure, we obtained regional information for virtually all firms included in the databases. 
 
GDP per Capita and Population 
The regional GDP per capita and population variables are drawn from the following sources: 
Europe: Eurostat, Regional Statistics
57; United States: Bureau of Economic Analysis, regional 
Statistics
58; Japan: Japan Statistic Bureau, Prefectural Statistics
59; China: Province data from 
Chinadataonline.org
60; India: State level data from the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO)
61. 
The data refers to 2006 and is expressed in national currencies (country dummies are included in 
all regressions).  
 
Rule of Law 
The Rule of Law variable measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The index is compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman 
et al, 2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. The data can be downloaded from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm 
 
Bilateral-trust instrumental variables: 
Somatic distance: This is obtained using the data from Guiso et al (2009) for most of our 
Europeans countries, and their methodology to extend to the rest of Europe, China and the US. 
Quoting from their paper: 
“We derive an indicator of somatic distance, based on the average frequency of specific 
traits in the indigenous population reported in Biasutti (1954). For height, hair color 
(pigmentation), and cephalic index (the ratio of the length and width of the skull), Biasutti 
(1954) draws a map of the prevailing traits in each country in Europe. For each trait, 
European Union countries fall into three different categories. For hair color we have 
“Blond prevails,” “Mix of blond and dark,” and “Dark prevails.” We arbitrarily assign 
the score of 1 to the first, 2 to the second and 3 to the third. When one’s country somatic 
characteristics belong to more than one category, we take the country’s most prevalent 





61 http://mospi.nic.in/cso_test1.htm   59
category. We then compute the somatic distance between two countries as the sum of the 
absolute value of the difference in each of these traits” 
We extend this be collecting data for China and Poland from Biasutti (1957), assuming 
Luxembourg has the average values for France and Germany, and the US has the values of its  
European immigrants, weighted by their ancestry shares reported in 1999 US Census. We use only 
European immigrants because they appear to overwhelming be the owners and managers of the 
types of medium sized manufacturing firms in our survey. 
 
Religious distance: Again, this is obtained from Guiso et al (2009) for most of our European 
countries, and their methodology to extend to the rest of Europe, China and the US. Quoting from 
their paper: 
“The first proxy for culture is an indicator of religious similarity equal to the empirical 
probability that two randomly chosen individuals in two countries will share the same 
religion. We obtain this measure by taking the product of the fraction of individuals in 
country j and in country i who have religion k and then we sum across all religions k (k = 
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, no-religion, other 
affiliation). To calculate this variable we use the percentage of people belonging to each 
religious denomination from the World Values Survey” 
We extend this to all other necessary country-pairs using the World Values Survey.  60
APPENDIX TABLE A1 
DETAILS OF THE DECENTRALIZATION SURVEY QUESTIONS 
The electronic survey, training materials and survey video footage are available on http://cep.lse.ac.uk/management/default.asp  
For Questions D1, D3 and D4 any score can be given, but the scoring guide is only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5.
Question D1: “To hire a FULL-TIME PERMANENT SHOPFLOOR worker what agreement would your plant need from CHQ (Central Head 
Quarters)?” 
Probe until you can accurately score the question – for example if they say “It is my decision, but I need sign-off from corporate HQ.” ask “How often would 
sign-off be given?” 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  No authority – even for replacement 
hires 
Requires sign-off from CHQ based on 
the business case. Typically agreed 
(i.e. about 80% or 90% of the time). 
Complete authority – it is my decision entirely 
 
Question D2: “What is the largest CAPITAL INVESTMENT your plant could make without prior authorization from CHQ?” 
Notes: (a) Ignore form-filling 
            (b) Please cross check any zero response by asking “What about buying a new computer – would that be possible?”, and then probe…. 
            (c) Challenge any very large numbers (e.g. >$¼m in US) by asking “To confirm your plant could spend $X on a new piece of equipment without prior 
clearance from CHQ?” 
            (d) Use the national currency and do not omit zeros (i.e. for a US firm twenty thousand dollars would be 20000). 
Question D3: “Where are decisions taken on new product introductions – at the plant, at the CHQ or both”? 
Probe until you can accurately score the question – for example if they say “It is complex, we both play a role “ask “Could you talk me through the process for 
a recent product innovation?” 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  All new product introduction 
decisions are taken at the CHQ 
 
New product introductions are jointly 
determined by the plant and CHQ 
All new product introduction decisions taken at 
the plant level 
Question D4: “How much of sales and marketing is carried out at the plant level (rather than at the CHQ)”? 
Probe until you can accurately score the question. Also take an average score for sales and marketing if they are taken at different levels. 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  None – sales and marketing is all run 
by CHQ 
Sales and marketing decisions are split 
between the plant and CHQ 
 
The plant runs all sales and marketing 
Question D5: “Is the CHQ on the site being interviewed”? 




DECENTRALIZATION: INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS BY COUNTRY 
 
 
 Hiring         
(1 to 5) 
Marketing      
 (1 to 5) 
 Product Introduction     
(1 to 5) 
 Investment  (Median, in $) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
China 3.20  1.43  1.75  604 
France 2.80  1.98  2.21  9,375 
Germany 2.93  2.17  2.57  12,500 
Greece 2.44  1.39  1.80  1,250 
India 2.77 1.79 2.16 220 
Italy 2.84  1.93  2.38  6,250 
Japan 1.96 1.70  1.91 1,720 
Poland 2.86  2.04  2.30  310 
Portugal 3.03  1.76  2.37  3,125 
Sweden 3.57  2.47  2.83  13,800 
UK 3.46  2.53  2.53  9,150 
US 3.86  2.17  2.58  7,500 
 
Notes: Averages of the individual components of the decentralization variable by country (N=3,380)   62
TABLE A3  
THE SURVEY SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
    All  CN  FR GE GR IN  IT  JP PO PT SW UK US  Missing, 
# 
Observations, #  4,038 325  323 348 187 470 204 122  239  177 286 649 694  n/a 
Firms, #  3,902 319  313 308 187 467 207 121  239  177 259 609 682  n/a 
Firms, excluding 
2004 resurvey, #      242  225            560  535  n/a 
Firm employees 
(median)  270  700  240 500 230 250 185 310  250  183 267 250 375  0 
Firm employees excl. 
2004 resurvey      200  325            250  300  n/a 
Plant employees 
(median)  150  500  150 225 120 150 150 150  150  125 150 140 150  0 
Production sites 
(median), #  2  1  3 2 1 1 2 2  1  1 2 2 3 94 
Age of firm 
34  12  39 40 32 22 33 57  31  35 62 34 33 101 
(median, years) 
Listed firm, %  14.5  6.4  4.6 16.4  18.7  26.2 1.4 28.3  2.3 5.6  1.7  6.5 30.1  121 
Share of workforce 
with degrees %  17.3  8  17.3 14.9 11.9  22  16.3 30.9 20  9.6  19.8 12.9 20.1  436 
Management (mean)   2.99  2.61  2.99  3.18  2.64  2.54 3 3.15  2.88  2.73  3.15 3 3.31  0 
Trust, %  38  65  17 33 15 39 40 43  31  16 72 36 42  48 
1-Lerner index  0.957  0.95  0.965  0.949  0.935  0.923  0.965  0.966  0.967  0.972 0.98 0.968 0.94  111 
Foreign 
multinationals, %  0.25  0.2  0.46 0.31 0.19  0.1  0.25 0.03  0.35  0.18 0.44 0.38 0.14  0 
Domestic 
multinationals, %  0.22  0.01  0.34 0.36 0.13 0.02 0.22 0.32  0.04 0.2  0.39 0.25 0.33  0 
Interview duration 
(minutes)  47.9  48.6  46.3 44.7 49.8 59.8 46.6 58.4  47.8  54.5 56.3 43.5 46.8  34 
Trust  0.39  0.54  0.21 0.35 0.23 0.39 0.38 0.42  0.26  0.16 0.66 0.34 0.43  0 
Hierarchy  0.34  0.01  0.56 0.38 0.91 0.11 0.79 0.03  0.94  0.82 0.01 0.18 0.27  395 
GDP per capita (in 
2006 US$)  29,380  333  39,525 40,132 20,871  356  35,812 24,695 7,987 20,926 45,977 49,864 89,968  23 
Regional Pop (‘000)  41,468  161.445 8,077 10,072 2,325 66,085  12,744  27,369  6,663 2,892  1,284  8,467 34,603  23 
Notes: All=All countries combined, CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United 
Kingdom, US=United States. 3902 firms with 4038 observations, since 136 firms were interviewed twice   63
TABLE A4 
 THE 2006 SAMPLING FRAME 
 
                    
 CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US  All 
Sampling frame, 
number of firms (#)  86,733 4,683 9,722 522 31,699 5,182 3,546 3,684 1,687 1,034 5,953 27,795 15,187 
 
Employees (median, 
sampling frame)  290  201 198  180 175  183 240 200 127 206 219  200  202 
 
Employees (median, 
conditioning on firms 
with 150+ employees)  290  291 285  269 229  262 240    260 239 315 311  300  274 
 
Publicly listed (%)  1  4 1  17  11 1 1 3 1 6 4  4  4 
 
Notes: CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. 
Sampling frame is the total number of eligible firms for the survey. The sampling frame includes all firms between 100 and 5,000 employees in the population accounting 
databases for all countries, excluding China and Japan (for which the employment bracket is 150 to 5,000 employees) and Portugal (for which the employment bracket is 75 to 
5,000 employees). Employees are the median number of employees in the firm. Publicly listed is the percentage of firms which are directly publicly listed (note that some firms 
may be privately incorporate subsidiaries of publicly listed parents). Indian and Japanese employment numbers are predicted from balance sheet information for privately held 




 THE COVERAGE OF THE FIRM ACCOUNTING DATABASES  
 
 
 CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US 
Employees in firms in accounting databases with 50+ 
employees, 000’s  56,742 2,223 6,453  153  6,773 1,754 9,214 1,224 380  331  2,188 15,150 
Employees in firms with 50+ employees in the 
accounting databases as % of Census data  84%  89% 117% 92% 103% 89% 137% 72% 96% 62% 100% 135% 
Sample median year  2007  2006 2006 2006 2004 2006 2007 2006 2006  2006 2006  2007 
Census year  2004  2006 2006 2006 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006  2006 2006  2006 
 
Notes: CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. 
This compares total employment in our accounting database (from which the sampling frame was drawn) that should cover the population of manufacturing firms with Census 
Bureau data (from mandatory government surveys). All census units are firms except India which is plant level. Employees in firms in the accounting databases with 50+ 
employees, 000’s reports the number of employees in firms in the accounting databases with 50 or more employees (in thousands). Employees in firms with 50+ in the 
accounting databases as % of Census data reports the share of employees in the accounting databases in firms with 50 or more  employees as a proportion of the values 
reported in national Census data (except for the US, where we report the share of employees in firms with 20 or more employees as the 50 or more cut-off is not available). 
Census data is drawn from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics for the European countries, Bureau of the Census for the US, Statistics Bureau for Japan, Annual Survey of 
Industries for India, and Chinese Industrial Survey. For China and India, Census calculations done by Albert Bollard on data provided by Pete Klenow. Consolidated accounts are 
excluded from accounting data to avoid duplications. Eurostat defines an enterprise as the “smallest combination of legal units that is an organizational unit producing goods or 
services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, and an enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more locations”. The Bureau of the 
Census defines an enterprise as “a business organization consisting of one or more domestic establishments under common ownership or control”.   The Statistics Bureau of Japan 
defines an enterprise as “an entity composed of the head office and branch establishments, if any, whose legal organization is a stock company, limited company, limited or 
unlimited partnership, limited liability company, or mutual insurance company”. In the Indian Annual Survey of Industries a factory “refers to any whereon ten or more workers 
are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is 
ordinarily so carried on, or whereon twenty or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing 
process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily  so carried on”. In the Chinese Industrial Survey “industrial establishments refer to economic units which are 
located in one single place and engage entirely or primarily in one kind of industrial activity, including financially independent industrial enterprises and units engaged in 
industrial activities under the non industrial enterprises (or financially dependent). Industrial establishments generally meet the following requirements: They have each one 
location and are engaged in one kind of industrial activity each; they operate and manage their industrial production activities separately; they have accounts of income and 
expenditures separately.” 
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TABLE A6: THE SURVEY RESPONSE RATE 
 
                  
 All  CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US 
Interviews 
completed (%)   44.9  43.9 59.3 58.6 53.4 61.4 68.2 21.5 37.5 60.5 68.2  32.9  37.2 
Interviews refused 
(%)  16.8  13.7 13.7 27.2 10.7 13.7 20.0 20.1 16.5 15.8 16.9  19.6  13.7 
Scheduling in 
progress (%)  38.3  40.1 27.0 14.2 35.9 25.0 11.8 58.4 46.0 23.7 14.9  47.4  49.1 
Survey sample, 
number firms (#)   8,690 727 528 526 350 761 304 563 637 293 380 1,851  1,833 
Interviews 
completed  (#)  3,902 319 313 308 187 467 207 121 239 177 259  609  682 
 
Notes: All=All countries combined, CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, 
PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. Interviews completed reports the percentage of companies contacted 
for which a management interview was completed. Interviews refused reports the percentage of companies contacted in which the manager 
contacted refused to take part in the interview. Scheduling in progress reports the percentage of companies contacted for which the 
scheduling was still in progress at the end of the survey period (so the firm had been contacted, with no interview run nor any manager 
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 TABLE A7 
 RESPONSE RATES TO THE SURVEY 
 
  (1) (2) 
Sample  All firms contacted  All firms contacted 
Log (Sales/employee)  0.029  
  (0.031)  
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
 §   0.025 
   (0.043) 
Trust (region)
§§  -0.226 0.310 
  (0.457) (0.580) 
Hierarchical (region)
 §§  -0.356 -0.301 
  (0.266) (0.423) 
Log (employment)   0.099*** 0.073** 
  (0.025) (0.031) 
Listed  -0.042 0.060 
  (0.075) (0.106) 
Log (Age of firm), in years  0.021 0.029 
  (0.028) (0.034) 
Multinational subsidiary  0.118** 0.125** 
  (0.051) (0.056) 
Days from the start of the survey until firm contacted
§  -0.087*** -0.101** 
  (0.023) (0.041) 
Country is China  -1.465*** n/a 
  (0.444)  
Country is France  0.886*** 0.837*** 
  (0.219) (0.247) 
Country is Germany  0.902*** 1.109*** 
  (0.171) (0.216) 
Country is Greece  0.512* 0.468 
  (0.275) (0.382) 
Country is India  0.583*** n/a 
  (0.218)  
Country is Italy  0.955*** 0.859** 
  (0.276) (0.359) 
Country is Japan  -0.123 n/a 
  (0.207)  
Country is Poland  0.726** 0.470 
  (0.286) (0.402) 
Country is Portugal  0.905** 1.016** 
  (0.369) (0.445) 
Country is Sweden  0.929*** 0.597** 
  (0.236) (0.256) 
Country is UK  0.114 Baseline 
  (0.105)  
Country is US  Baseline n/a 
Pseudo R
2  0.162 0.138 
Number of firms  6,679 4,308 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for a completed interview. All columns estimated by probit with robust standard errors 
in parentheses (marginal effects reported). All columns include a full set of 44 interviewer dummies, and 142 three digit industry 
dummies. The dependent variable takes value one if the firm was interviewed, and zero if the interview was refused, or if 
scheduling was still in progress as the end of the project. In column (2) firms are dropped if Return on Capital Employed data is 
available. § Coefficient and standard-errors multiplied by 100. §§ Refers to region where the company is headquartered. 
Regressions weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country.   67
 
 
TABLE A8  
 WORLD VALUES SURVEY SAMPLE 
 
WVS  Wave  1981-1984 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 Total 
        
China  0 983  1,064  0  2,047 
France  0 939 0  1,560  2,499 
Germany  1,084 2,893 1,956 1,937  7,870 
Greece  0 0 0  4.972  4.972 
India  0 2,365  1,769  1,898  6,032 
Italy  0 1,931 0 1,946  3,877 
Japan  1,099 911  990 1,254  4,254 
Poland  0 1,709 0 1,059  2,768 
Portugal  0 1,149 0  975  2,124 
Sweden  0 944 0 974  1,918 
United Kingdom  0 1,440  1,073  921  3,434 
United States  0 1,764  1,458  1,188  4,410 
         
Total  2,183 17,028 8,310 13,712  41,233 
 
Notes: Number of respondents used to build regional trust and religion aggregates by country and World Values Survey wave. Data 
relative to Greece are built from the ESS, using all available waves between 2000 and 2005.  
  